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This manual is a resource for attorneys representing incarcerated clients in appeals of parole 
release denials. It may also be useful for incarcerated people representing themselves pro se in 




Nothing in this manual constitutes legal advice, and providing this manual does not create, in any 
form or capacity, an attorney-client relationship between the sender and recipient.   
 
III. OVERVIEW OF PAROLE AND PAROLE APPEALS 
 
Parole is a system of discretionary release for people serving indeterminate sentences. An 
indeterminate sentence is a prison term imposed by a sentencing court that does not specify the 
exact number of years to be served within the range imposed (for example, 2 to 4 years or 25 
years to life).  
 
Those serving indeterminate sentences are eligible for parole after serving the minimum number 
of years imposed (2 years on a sentence of 2-4 and 25 years on a sentence of 25 to life). The 
Board of Parole decides who may be released on parole. 
 
Members of the Board of Parole, also called Commissioners, are appointed by the Governor and 
confirmed by the New York State Senate.  The Executive Law, which governs the Parole Board, 
allows for 19 Commissioners. As of June 1, 2019, there are 16 seated Commissioners.  
  
Parole is the only path to freedom for individuals serving indeterminate sentences with a 
maximum of life.2  As of January 2018, 8,625 people (representing almost 18% of the prison 
population) were serving a sentence with a maximum of life in New York State.3 
 
When individuals appear for an “interview”4 before the Parole Board, they generally are heard 
via video conference by three parole commissioners.5  
 
Interviews last from a few minutes to an hour (though most tend to be brief), during which 
Commissioners typically spend most of the time questioning the applicant about the crime(s) of 
 
2 While the Governor has virtually unfettered power to grant clemency and commute a person’s sentence, it is a 
power that is seldom used. 
3 See, Kim Dworakowski, N.Y. State Dep’t Of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Under Custody Report: Profile of Under 
Custody Population As Of January 1, 2018 (2018), 
http://www.doccs.ny.gov/Research/Reports/2018/Under%20Custody%20Report%202018.pdf 
4 An applicant’s appearance (live or via video conference) before parole commissioners was commonly referred to 
as a “hearing,” but this implies that the Board engages in a quasi-judicial evidentiary hearing, which it, 
unfortunately, does not. Also, the statute provides for an “interview,” not a hearing. See Exec. Law sec 259-
i(6)(a)(i).   
5 Ideally, parole interviews would take place face-to-face but that is increasingly rare.  Similarly, two-person panels 
are common.  In two-person panels, there must be a unanimous decision, otherwise the interview is void and the 




conviction. Commissioners also note, though rarely discuss, the relevant statutory requirements 
(detailed below), such as the applicant’s institutional achievements and risk assessment scores.  
The Board has two weeks from the interview to issue its written decision.  9 NYCRR 8002.3(b).  
 
In parole interviews with three commissioners, a majority (2-1) grants an applicant freedom or 
denies release. If parole is denied, the Commissioners can place a “hold” of up to 24 months 
before the next parole interview. Executive Law 259-i(2)(a). Before 2017, two-year holds were 
routine, but the Board now more regularly holds applicants for 12-18 months.6  
 
The Parole Board has wide discretion to grant or deny parole, but it must follow the statutory and 
regulatory requirements discussed below and spelled out in New York’s Executive Law which 
authorizes the Parole Board to promulgate regulations. Regulations have the force of law if 
properly promulgated and consistent with the Executive Law. The Regulations are codified in 9 
NYCRR 8000-8011. The relevant part of the Executive Law is Section 259-i (N.Y. Exec. Law 
§ 259-i). 
 
Applicants denied parole release have a right to appeal. There are two steps to the appeals 
process. First, the appellant must file an administrative appeal with the Parole Board in which the 
Board reviews its own decision via its Appeals Unit. The Appeals Unit evaluates whether the 
Parole Board interview and subsequent decision met the requirements of the Executive Law, and 
sends its determination to three members of the Parole Board (none of whom were part of the 
person’s parole interview/decision) who then decide whether to accept or reject the findings of 
the Appeals Unit. 
 
If, as is usually the case, the administrative appeal is denied, the applicant has “exhausted” 
administrative remedies and may now file an Article 78 petition in Supreme Court, again 
challenging the lawfulness of the parole denial.  
 
This manual provides a detailed breakdown of the Executive Law and regulations governing 
parole, offers a procedural and substantive look at the parole appeals process, provides some 
relevant case law, and flags issues to raise on appeal.  
 
IV. NOTES ABOUT WORKING WITH AND ON BEHALF OF INCARCERATED PEOPLE 
 
A. General Thoughts 
 
6 Some people believe this practice is designed to moot appellate challenges to parole denials since an appeal can 
take longer than the next scheduled parole appearance.  Mootness is a recurring issue with parole appeals.  For 
example, a person has their parole interview January 1, 2019, parole is denied on January 14, 2019, and the Board 
sets the next parole interview for 12 months (January 14, 2020).  If the appeal is not decided prior to January 14, 
2020, the Board will likely argue that the parole interview of January 14, 2020 renders the parole appeal moot since 
the only currently available remedy for a winning appeal is a new parole interview (called a “de novo” parole 
interview). As a result, it is critical that the appeal process is carried out as fast as possible.  See e.g. Gourdine v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 150 A.D.3d 1491, 1492 (3d Dep’t, 2017) (“Petitioner's reappearance before 
respondent in May 2015, at which his request for parole was denied, rendered moot his challenge to respondent's 
denial of his prior request for parole in May 2013). But see Rivera v. Stanford, 2019 WL 2030503, at *1 (2d Dept, 
2019) (Finding appeal was not moot since an intervening denial of parole was vacated by the Board’s Appeals Unit 





Many of our readers who are representing people in a pro bono setting have had little contact 
with people in prison. We offer the following to guide you in your representation, and as 
important context for your work.  
 
Regulation of Body and Mind: 
Every aspect of the lives of people in prison is regulated by the state. The state limits people’s 
contact with the outside world, their access to resources and vital services, their mobility 
throughout the prison, and every part of their daily life. People cannot receive calls. The calls 
they can make are recorded and catalogued. Their mail is scrutinized and searched. People 
cannot turn off their own lights or lock their own doors. They must eat at a certain time, with 
specific utensils, and bathe at a certain time. Privacy is non-existent. Norms that exist on the 
inside (economies, values, things you can and can’t do) are not always intuitive for people who 
do not have experience in prison.  
 
People inside are also often deprived of food, therapeutic and medical services, social 
interaction, physical contact, and time outdoors. Isolation is an inherent part of incarceration. 
Many people are placed in solitary confinement, sometimes for months or years. 
 
High Stakes and Serious Consequences 
To ensure that people in prison conform to this culture of control, the state uses a multitude of 
tactics to force compliance. Physical, emotional and psychological abuse by officers and prison 
staff is commonplace. People inside are regularly subjected to brutality and neglect, sometimes 
sustaining disabling, life-threatening and fatal injuries. There are numerous stories within the last 
few years of people who have been killed by correctional officers inside New York State 
facilities. Officers and staff frequently use strip searches, cell searches and other intrusive 
practices to humiliate and dehumanize people. Fear of retaliation sometimes prevents those 
inside from reporting such conduct.  
 
The state has also created an elaborate system of disciplinary codes and rules, which regulate 
even the most basic activities. Forgetting to turn off a hot plate, or being “out of order” in a line, 
can result in extreme punishment. Time in solitary confinement, deprivation of mail or 
commissary rights are all potential consequences for even the smallest infractions.  
 
Because of the high stakes, advocates and attorney must be hyper-vigilant and aware of the 
potential consequences our actions may have on the people we work with. If you go for a visit, 
remember the person you are seeing will be strip-searched before and after. Also remember that 
all social phone calls are recorded, and that discussing something on the phone might have 
consequences later on. Mis-addressing an envelope, or accidentally sending contraband in the 
mail, could result in a cell search, a meeting with the prison Superintendent, a loss of 
commissary or even solitary confinement.  
 
Clarity is Key 
It is important to make sure the person you are working with knows who you are, what 
organization you are affiliated with, what you can offer, whether you are a volunteer or paid 




detail. Also make the scope of your advocacy clear. It is important to establish your capacity 
upfront. This allows people to create realistic expectations, and to understand your limitations 
and capabilities.  
 
Conversations About Capacity are Key 
Because of the conditions of their confinement, people in prison often have extensive needs, 
whether it’s assistance with filing a parole appeal, suing the Department of Corrections for 
medical neglect, or just getting access to their commissary funds.  
 
It is vital to tell someone you’re working with if/when you don’t have the capacity to do 
something that they’ve asked of you. This ensures realistic expectations and prevents future 
disappointment and miscommunication. It also ensures that you don’t use your position to 
convey the “no” in other ways, such as distancing yourself, ignoring the ask or simply not doing 
the thing requested.  
 
It is important to reconsider what your capacity might be in any given situation. The goal is not 
to exert predetermined boundaries, but to listen and take in what the person is asking for. It’s 
always better to say something like, “I don’t know if that’s something I can do, but let me think 
about it and get back to you on our next call/in a letter this week/etc.”   
 
Additionally, this approach allows for collaborative thinking. Although you may not be able to 
do the exact thing that is asked of you, you can generate another solution together. By doing so, 
you are recognizing another person’s humanity, and acknowledging that you are two people 
trying to build a successful relationship. Stating your needs and establishing boundaries also 
indicates that the other person has the capacity to appreciate and respect your wishes, and even 
reciprocate with their own.  
 
This process of negotiation can also reduce some of the power dynamics present in your 
relationship, and is an important alternative to the historical dynamic in which the incarcerated 
person comes up with ideas for support and the person on the outside has the final word on the 
terms of the relationship. 
 
Assume Knowledge but Also Recognize Limitations 
Many people inside are experts and scholars in a variety of academic fields, including the law. 
Jailhouse lawyers are some of the most talented attorneys in the state, and have the capacity to 
make significant contributions to their own legal cases and to criminal justice policy. 
 
Conversely, people in prison hear a lot of misinformation, whether it is about legal issues, or 
other topics. Talking about these issues without judgment or condescension is crucial to a 
relationship based on solidarity.  
 
Although an immense amount of self-education happens inside, it’s important not to assume that 
everyone has had access to that experience. Many people were deprived of education from a 
young age, or had a learning disability that went undiagnosed, and therefore struggle with even 





Recognize Dynamics of Power and Privilege 
The criminal legal system and prison systems reflect and reinforce hierarchies of power, 
privilege, and oppression. All of us in the free world come from a place of power and privilege 
by virtue of living with far fewer restrictions on our freedom and far greater access to 
information and resources.  
 
Many of us also have socially assigned power and privilege (such as white privilege, class 
privilege, citizenship status, male privilege or privilege from being gender conforming) and often 
simultaneously have experiences of oppression (based on gender identity or expression, 
homophobia or transphobia, Islamophobia, xenophobia, classism, ageism, ableism, or others).   
 
Building relationships with and representing people inside across differences in race, class, 
gender, sexual orientation, religion, language access, age, experiences of incarceration, and other 
differences, requires careful attention to recognizing how dynamics of power, privilege, and 
oppression unfold. It also requires a commitment to examining those dynamics, striving always 
to share power, and taking responsibility and apologizing when we act or respond in oppressive 
ways.  
 
B. A Note on Language 
 
This section was adopted from an open letter from The Center for NuLeadership on Urban 
Solutions, a human justice policy, advocacy and training center founded, directed and staffed by 
academics and activists who were formerly incarcerated. 
 
“One of our first initiatives is to respond to the negative public perception about our population 
as expressed in the language and concepts used to describe us...We are referred to as inmates, 
convicts, prisoners and felons. All terms devoid of humanness which identify us as “things” 
rather than as people. These terms are accepted as the “official” language of the media, law 
enforcement, prison industrial complex and public policy agencies. However, they are no longer 
acceptable for us and we are asking people to stop using them. 
 
In an effort to assist our transition from prison to our communities as responsible citizens and to 
create a more positive human image of ourselves, we are asking everyone to stop using negative 
terms and to simply refer to us as PEOPLE. People currently or formerly incarcerated, 
PEOPLE on parole, PEOPLE recently released from prison, PEOPLE in prison, PEOPLE with 
criminal convictions, but PEOPLE.  
 
We habitually underestimate the power of language. The bible says, “Death and life are in the 
power of the tongue.” In fact, all of the faith traditions recognize the power of words and, in 
particular, names that we are given or give ourselves. Ancient traditions considered the “naming 
ceremony” one of the most important rites of passage. Your name indicated not only who you 
were and where you belonged, but also who you could be. The worst part of repeatedly hearing 
your negative definition of me, is that I begin to believe it myself “for as a man thinketh in his 
heart, so is he.” It follows then, that calling me inmate, convict, prisoner, felon, or offender 
indicates a lack of understanding of who I am, but more importantly what I can be. I can be and 





The Center for NuLeadership on Urban Solutions believes that if we can get progressive 
publications, organizations and individuals like you to stop using the old offensive language and 
simply refer to us as “people,” we will have achieved a significant step forward in our life-giving 
struggle to be recognized as the human beings we are. We have made our mistakes, yes, but we 
have also paid or are paying our debts to society. 
 
We believe we have the right to be called by a name we choose, rather than one someone else 
decides to use. We think that by insisting on being called “people” we reaffirm our right to be 
recognized as human beings, not animals, inmates, prisoners or offenders.” 
 
V. COMMUNICATION WITH CLIENTS 
 
Attorneys can communicate with clients via letters, phone calls and in-person visits. The attorney 
and client should decide together how to communicate.  
 
A. Legal Calls 
 
Legal calls are designed to provide a secure, unmonitored line for attorneys and their 
representatives to talk privately and confidentially with clients. Legal calls are limited to one per 
month, and last only 30 minutes. See DOCCS Directive 4423 for more details. Prison staff are 
required to provide clients with a confidential location for these calls, although this rule is 
seldom followed. Many people believe that even these phone calls are recorded and monitored 
and it is best to avoid discussing matters that present any potential liability. 
 
Legal calls are arranged in advance, with at least 24 hours’ notice, by the attorney or their 
representative with the client’s Offender Rehabilitation Coordinator, or “ORC.” The ORCs work 
in the Guidance department at the prison where the client is located. Attorneys should call the 
prison and request to speak with staff in Guidance, who can then locate your client’s ORC.  
 
B. Non-Legal Calls 
 
Non-legal or “social” calls are calls made directly by people in prison to people on the outside. 
These calls are recorded and monitored, and the calls often have a time limit (usually 15 or 30 
minutes). The calls are also made from phones in more public locations like the gym, dorm 
room, or law library. There is no limit on the number of social calls people in prison may make, 
although many prisons have strict rules about when people are able to access the phones. 
Remember that you cannot call your clients. The only way to talk by phone is if your client calls 
you directly.  
i. Telephone list and phone procedures 
 
Incarcerated people may only call people on their approved “telephone list.” The list is usually 
limited to 10 people. In order to have phone communication with your client, they will need to 
add you to their list, which may mean the person must delete someone else off their list in order 





To receive calls from prisons, you need to set up an account at: https://securustech.net. Once 
you’ve set up an account, you can receive calls from prisons in New York State. The service 
requires a minimum balance to start an account. Multiple phone numbers can be associated with 
one account and you can receive calls on your cell phone. 
 
When you receive a call from a prison, the number will often be blocked.  When you answer, 
there will be an automated message. Follow the instructions. Also note that people inside cannot 
leave you messages.   
 
Note that the Department of Corrections & Community Supervision sets forth rules regarding 
phone calls, which you can read at: http://www.doccs.ny.gov/Directives/4423.pdf.   
 
Also note that DOCCS prohibits three-person calls. Only the client and the person they’ve called 
directly from their phone can be on the line.  
 
ii. Other tips for phone calls  
 
Setting up a regularly scheduled call, whether it’s weekly or monthly, can help ease 
communication.  
 
Because phone time is limited, strive to strike a balance between listening empathically to the 
stories the person is sharing and ensuring that you get the information that you need to best 
advocate for them. Equally important, you should recognize that prison is an incredibly violent 
and traumatic place and the person you’re working with might be calling you to receive a few 
minutes of respite and connection.  
 
Also remember that every person is different in terms of what they are willing to discuss on the 
phone. Some people would rather not talk on the phone at all for fear of surveillance, while 
others feel comfortable speaking very freely about their thoughts and feelings. 
 
C. Legal Mail 
 
Letter writing is a very important part of communicating with people in prison. When sending 
letters to people in prison, you can send both legal and non-legal mail. 
 
Also known as “privileged correspondence,” legal mail offers opportunities for attorneys and 
their representatives, law offices, and legal services providers to communicate confidentially 
with people in prison but great care should nevertheless be taken regarding what you write and 
what you ask from the person you are assisting.  
 
A “legal mail” designation is based on the identity of the sender (aka attorneys, law firms, etc.), 
not the content of the mail itself. Legal mail is preferred for all communications containing 
sensitive or confidential information, and for relevant communications that are more than five 





Legal mail is delivered more quickly than non-legal mail and it affords greater privacy since it 
can only be opened in the presence of the person to whom it is addressed (as opposed to non-
legal mail that is opened and read in the package room by prison staff before it reaches the 
recipient). Beware, however, that legal mail is still opened and visually scanned for 
“contraband.”   
 
i. Procedures for Sending Legal Mail 
 
1. At the top of your letter underneath the letterhead, include “LEGAL, PRIVILEGED 
AND CONFIDENTIAL MAIL.” 
2. Address the envelope by writing the client’s full DOCCS name (not their preferred name, 
if there is a difference), and Department Identification Number (DIN). If you do not 
include their DIN, the letter can be handed over to the warden, opened and read, causing 
a serious breach of confidentiality and putting the client at risk for retribution. 
3. Include the address of the facility where the person is located. Make sure to use the 
address meant for “inmate” mail, as DOCCS calls it, and not the general administrative 
address for the prison. You can find a list of prison addresses here: 
http://www.doccs.ny.gov/faclist.html.  
4. The return address field should have your name, the name of your firm and your return 
address.   
5. Prominently write in red “CONFIDENTIAL LEGAL MAIL” along the bottom of the 
front of the envelope and on the back. 
 
The “to” field should look like this: 
  
Client Name (DIN 00-0-000) 
Name of Correctional Facility 
Address of Facility (including P.O Box if necessary) 
 
The “from” field should look like this: 
  
Your Name 
Your Firm or Organization 
Your Address 
 
D. Sending packages 
 
Review http://www.doccs.ny.gov/FamilyGuide/AllowableItems.html thoroughly before sending 
packages. At some facilities, people are only allowed four packages per year. Note that DOCCS 
rarely accepts food packages or other items such as books from law firms. You can simply send 
the package from your law firm’s address, but use just your name and not the law firm title.  
 
E. Legal and Non-Legal Visits  
 





Social visits are open to anyone, whether family, friends or advocates. They are not confidential 
in nature and take place in the large visiting rooms. Visitors cannot bring in pen, paper or 
advocacy materials. However, no pre-approval or permission is required to do a social visit. You 
just show up on the day-of.  
 
Visiting hours, as well as policies, vary significantly from prison to prison, and it’s important to 
get all the information you need before going on a social visit. Call the facility and ask about:  
- Visitation days/times: Are there general visitation hours? Are the days scheduled based 
on the person’s name or DIN? When does “count” take place? (Incarcerated people 
cannot move from place to place when the prison is physically counting the population) 
- Special procedures/requirements for visitation, such as restrictions on certain clothing 
- How many people can visit at once? 
- Procedures for leaving documents or packages  
 
Remember to talk to the person you plan to visit about whether there are certain days or times 
that they would prefer, and if there are any dates that family members, friends, or anyone else is 
planning to visit, so that you don’t conflict with those visits.  
 
ii. Legal Visits 
 
Legal visits are confidential visits where attorneys can discuss legal matters with their clients. 
Most legal visits happen in a small room with a door and/or window, although some prisons have 
only one large visiting room and little space for private visits. Legal visits are often only 
permitted on weekdays, although some prisons permit them on weekends. Legal visits must be 
scheduled 24 hours in advance (although seven days is preferable).  
 
During legal visits, attorneys may bring in legal papers and other advocacy materials, as well as a 
pen, as long as they request permission to bring these items in beforehand.  
 
Legal visits are governed by DOCCS Director 4404, which can be found at: 
http://www.doccs.ny.gov/Directives/4404.pdf 
 
iii. Scheduling a Legal Visit 
 
To arrange a legal visit, follow these steps carefully: 
  
1. Call the prison and ask to arrange a legal visit. The operator will transfer you to the 
appropriate person. Often this person is in the Inmate Records Department, or is the 
client’s Offender Rehabilitation Coordinator (ORC).   
2. Legal visit days and times vary from prison to prison. Note that many prisons end visits 
at 2:30pm.  
3. Generally scheduling a legal visit requires sending a written request to the prison and/or 
legal visit coordinator. Remember to request special permission to bring in and/or leave 




4. Call the prison to re-confirm your visit the day before and bring a copy of the legal visit 
request with you. 
5. You may also want to try and call to confirm THE DAY OF THE VISIT, that the person 
you’re visiting is present at the facility and not on an outside medical appointment.  
 
F. Tips for all visits 
 
Wear clothes that are comfortable and modest. DOCCS does not permit sandals or open-toed 
shoes, tank tops, exposed shoulders or knees, or leggings or “jeggings.” Underwire bras and 
binders may set off the metal detectors. If they do, the prison staff may ask you to remove those 
undergarments, inspect them, and have you walk through the detectors without them on. 
  
You will need to leave most of your belongings in your car (including your phone, wallet, etc.). 
If you take public transportation, there will be lockers for you to use (some lockers require 
quarters to access).  You can and should bring inside with you: 
 
- Your client’s name and DIN 
- Legal visit request and paperwork, if going on a legal visit 
- Cash or credit card for the vending machines (quarters and singles may be preferable, but 
some prisons allow you to bring in larger denominations and some permit credit cards) 
- Your ID, which can be: 
-  A driver’s license with photo; 
- A Department of Motor Vehicles non-driver photo identification; 
- Government-issued photo identification; 
- Armed Services I.D. with photo; 
- Employment identification with a photo; 
- NYS Unified Court System Secure Pass 
 
VI. LETTER OF ENGAGEMENT AND RELEASES 
 
The first step in your representation is to send your client an engagement and/or retainer letter to 
be signed and returned to you as quickly as possible. The letter should specify who you are, the 
scope of your representation, what you can and cannot do as this person’s attorney, and any other 
details you wish to include. Make sure to relay that your services are free and that you will cover 
all related filing costs.  
 
Enclosed with your letter you should include several release forms that you may need to retrieve 
any relevant documents that you do not already have. Include with your letter the following 
releases: 
• Office of Mental Health (OMH) Authorization for Release of Information  
• Authorization for Release of Health Information Pursuant to HIPPA 
• General Release of Confidential Information from DOCCS (Dept. of Corrections and 
Community Supervision) 
 
Sample forms can be found at the back of this guide and both the OMH and HIPPA forms are 





VII. PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES AND FILING INSTRUCTIONS 
 
A. Administrative Appeal  
 
Appealing a parole denial is a two-step process. First, an administrative appeal must be filed with 
the Board of Parole and is reviewed by the Board’s internal Appeals Unit. An analysis of 
administrative appeal decisions reveals that less than 11% of administrative appeals are granted 
and most of those are for technical defects such as the Board’s failure to obtain the “case plan” or 
“TAP.”7 
 
If the administrative appeal is unsuccessful, then applicants may file an Article 78 petition in 
state Supreme Court, See People ex. rel Martinez v. Beaver, 8 A.D.3d 1095 (4th Dep’t 2004) 
(dismissing an Article 78 petition filed while an administrative appeal was still pending).  
 
B. Steps to Filing an Administrative Appeal   
 
DOCCS Directive 8360, http://www.doccs.ny.gov/Directives/8360.pdf, outlines the procedural 
requirements for filing an administrative appeal. In addition, be sure to familiarize yourself with 
the regulations governing administrative appeals of parole denials, see 9 NYCRR 8006 et seq.  
 
1. Notice of Appeal:  
To appeal a parole denial, a “Notice of Appeal” must be filed with the Board of Parole’s Appeals 
Unit within 30 calendar days of the applicant’s receipt of the decision denying parole. A 
copy of the Notice of Appeal will most likely be included with the parole decision given to the 
parole applicant. 9 NYCRR 8006.1(b). 
 
On the notice, check the appropriate box in order to request a transcript of the parole interview, 
so that you can review it and reference it in the appeal. There is no requirement that the form be 
used; a letter will suffice, but be sure to request the parole interview transcript in the letter as 
well. 9 NYCRR 8006.1(d). 
 
Notices of Appeal must be sent to the following address within 30 days of receiving the denial: 
 
New York State Board of Parole, Appeals Unit  
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision  
Harriman State Campus – Building #2  
1220 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY 12226 
 
Note: some clients may complete and send the notice of appeal on their own behalf before 
assignment of counsel. As people are entitled to representation at the administrative appeal level, 
some clients may also request counsel from the local court before you receive the case. If 18-B 
counsel has been assigned, pro bono should communicate with 18-B counsel to notify them of 
your plan to represent the client.  
 
7 TAP is a transitional accountability plan which is only applicable to those entering the system after 2011. Few of 





2. Confirming Receipt of Notice:  
Upon receipt of a Notice of Appeal (NOA), the Parole Appeals Unit will send a letter 
acknowledging receipt. If you do not receive this acknowledgment letter within 2-3 weeks 
after filing the Notice, contact the Appeals Unit at once, to confirm receipt. Do not let 30 
days elapse without confirming receipt. Id. at (f). 
 
3. Filing a Notice of Appearance (NOA): 
Counsel is required to file a notice of appearance with the Appeals Unit, which must include the 
appellant’s name and Department Identification Number (DIN) and other information. 9 NYCRR 
8006.1(d).  A sample NOA is a attached. Only one individual may be named as counsel in the 
notice of appearance. Once the appearance has been entered, the Appeals Unit will not entertain 
correspondence from the client. 9 NYCRR §8006.2(d)(e).  The notice of appeal and the notice of 
appearance may be included in one letter.  
 
4. Request the Parole File 
As soon as possible, request all documents relied on by the Board in making the parole 
determination.  See below for a detailed explanation of the documents relied on and the law 
governing disclosure to the parole applicant and counsel.  
 
5. Perfecting the Appeal:  
After the Notice of Appeal has been filed, the appeal must be perfected within 120 calendar 
days of filing. This date will be specified in the Appeal Unit’s letter acknowledging receipt 
of the NOA. An appeal is perfected by filing an original and two copies of a written brief and all 
documents relied on with the Appeals Unit. §8006.2(b).  
 
If you need an extension of time to perfect the appeal, write to the Appeals Unit before the 
deadline and explain the reason(s) why an extension is needed. See 9 NYCRR §8006.2(a) 
(allowing extensions “for good cause shown.”).  But, before requesting an extension consider 
that time is of the essence in parole appeals to avoid the next regularly scheduled parole review 
mooting out the appeal process.  Extensions are granted liberally. 
 
6. Final Administrative Appeal Decision and Remedies:  
The administrative appeal will be reviewed and decided on the basis of the written record 
alone—appearances and oral argument are prohibited. 9 NYCRR §8006.2(c).  
 
After the perfected appeal is submitted, the Board’s Appeals Unit reviews the case and 
issues a “Statement of Appeals Unit’s Findings and Recommendation.”  
 
The Appeals Unit then sends the paperwork to an “Appellate Panel” of three Parole Board 
Commissioners who did not participate in the original decision. The Appellate Panel will then 
decide whether to affirm, modify or reverse the parole denial, and will send a final 
“Administrative Appeal Decision Notice” to both the parole applicant and their attorney.   
 
If the final decision is at “variance” with the Appeals Unit’s findings or recommendation, a 




only result in a new interview or reduce the duration of the “hold” until the next interview; the 
Appeals Unit and the Appellate Panel do not have the authority to grant parole at this juncture. 
 
There is no stated deadline for the Appellate Panel to render this final decision. See 9 NYCRR 
§8006.4(b) (stating that appeals will be considered by three Board members “as soon as 
practicable”). If, however, the final decision is not made within four months after receipt of the 
perfected appeal, the appeal decision is “deemed adverse,” the administrative remedy is 
considered “exhausted,” and an applicant may move forward with the next phase of the appeal, 
an Article 78 petition. 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c). 
 
If the appeal is successful, meaning three parole commissioners or two out of three reverse the 
parole denial, a “de novo” or “special consideration” interview will be ordered before a different 
set of Commissioners. Here there is no specified time by which this de novo interview must take 
place, and the Board may use its discretion to schedule a new appearance.  
 
C. Publication of Administrative Appeal Decisions 
 
As of November 1, 2018, the Board must publish all administrative appeal decisions online in a 
searchable database. The Board has slowly begun to comply with the mandate and currently 
publishes decisions online at http://www.doccs.ny.gov/parole_board_appeal_decisions.html.  
 
D. Exhaustion  
 
All applicants must exhaust their administrative remedies before filing an Article 78 petition in 
Supreme Court. This requirement is especially frustrating given that administrative appeals are 
denied more than 90% of the time, and in most cases the ultimate goal is to get before a judge via 
an Article 78 petition. An exception to the exhaustion requirement exists where it is 
demonstrated that “further pursuit of an administrative appeal would have been futile,” but courts 
to date have summarily rejected this defense in the context of administrative appeals of parole 
denials. Toro v. Evans, 95 A.D.3d 1573 (3rd Dep’t 2012); People ex rel. Martinez v. Beaver, 8 
A.D.3d 1095 (4th Dep’t 2004). Still, it may be worth making the argument that the Parole 
Board’s internal appeals process is futile pending unique circumstances and the issues raised. 
 
E. Preservation  
 
Any issue not raised in the Administrative Appeal risks being dismissed in a subsequent Article 
78 for failure to preserve.  See, e.g., Matter of Rodriguez v. Coughlin, 219 A.D.2d 876 (4th Dep’t 
1995) (holding “this Court has no discretionary power to reach” a Due Process claim not raised 
on administrative appeal). It is therefore critical that all grounds for appeal and relevant facts are 
included in your brief perfecting the Administrative Appeal. Any issue omitted in this brief will 
not be considered later in the appeals process.  Note that some courts have held that the 
applicant’s failure to preserve the issue at the interview stage also precludes Article 78 review.  
Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc. 3d 896, 901 (Sup. Ct., Albany Cnty, 2013), aff'd, 117 A.D.3d 1258 (3d 
Dep’t 2014)(“Petitioner failed to raise a timely objection during the hearing, and has thus failed 





F. Filing an Article 78 Proceeding  
 
The following information is designed to provide you with the broad contours of how to file an 
Art. 78. The particulars will vary from county to county and, as in all areas of practice, you must 
consult the law and local court rules carefully. Familiarize yourself with CPLR 7801 et seq, and 
Siegel’s New York Practice is an excellent procedural guide.  
 
The Art. 78 challenges the parole denial itself, not merely the administrative appeal process and 
decision. One reason not to make an issue of the fairness of the administrative parole appeal 
process (other than to say that it resulted in an erroneous administrative affirmance) is that a win 
would result in a remand for a new administrative appeal – likely a waste of time and not the 
path to your client’s liberty. 
 
The grounds for appeal are detailed below, but in general the Art. 78 proceeding raises the 
“question” whether “a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by 
an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion, including abuse of 
discretion as to the measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed.”  CPLR §7803(3).  
 
Time for Filing:  
An Article 78 claim may be brought only after the Appeals Unit of the Parole Board denies an 
administrative appeal or fails to make a final determination within four months. (As discussed 
supra, failure of the Appeals Unit to timely render its findings will be treated as a conclusive 
denial of the appeal for the purposes of filing an Article 78 petition.)  
 
An Article 78 petition must be brought within 120 days of the date of the administrative 
appeal final decision. CPLR 217(1). And, although there is no law on this issue, it is safer to 
assume that the same statute of limitations is triggered when there is no administrative decision 
four months after perfecting the appeal.  This is a hard statute of limitations; no extensions or 
postponements are available. 
 
Venue: 
In many cases, multiple venues will be proper under CPLR §506(b). Attorneys should first 
ascertain all available venues, and then determine the optimal venue.8  To the extent there is a 
choice as to venue, consider whether binding precedent differs from county to county.  For 
example, see XII A, regarding the split in the appellate division departments as to reliance solely 
on the nature of the crime.  
 
Article 78 petitions may be filed in the county where the administrative appeal was decided, 
where the original parole denial was decided (often the Commissioners’ location during the 
parole interview), the county where the parole applicant currently resides (the county where the 
prison is located), or the county where the Attorney General has her main office (Albany 
 
8 The relevant statute reads, in part: “A proceeding against a body or officer shall be commenced in any county 
within the judicial district where the respondent made the determination complained of or refused to perform the 
duty specifically enjoined upon him by law, or where the proceedings were brought or taken in the course of which 
the matter sought to be restrained originated, or where the material events otherwise took place, or where the 






In some instances, petitioners have been successful in filing Article 78s in their county of 
conviction, but New York courts are split on whether the crime of conviction qualifies as a 
“material event” under the CPLR§ 506(b), thus allowing for proper venue. Compare Coaxum v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 14 Misc.3d 661, 664–66 (Sup. Ct. Bx. Cty., Sept. 8, 2006) 
(holding that the crime of conviction was a “material event” in petitioner’s parole determination, 
“[p]articularly where the Board’s determination relied so extensively on that offense”); 
Crimmins v. Dennison, 12 Misc.3d 725, 730 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., Mar. 29, 2006) (finding proper 
venue in the county of the crime and sentence); with Philips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23–24 
(1st Dep’t 2007) (“Under CPLR 506(b), the ‘material events’ leading to the subject parole 
determination were not the crime and sentence, but ‘the decision-making process leading to the 
determination under review.’”) (citing Vigilante v. Dennison, 36 A.D.3d 620, 622 (2nd Dep’t 
2007)). See also Wallace v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 14 Misc.3d 372, 374–75 (Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. Cty. May 10, 2006) (highlighting the conflicting opinions before ultimately deciding that 
venue is improper in the county of conviction).  
 
Necessary Documents:  
 
An Art. 78 petition may be filed by notice of petition or by order to show cause [OTSC].  The 
OTSC method is used if there is a need for expedited review.  The filing requirements vary from 
county to county.  For example, some counties require e-filing.  The information below provides 
the broad contours of the process but you must consult the court rules and clerks as to county 
specifics.  
 
In general, certain documents must be filed with the court to obtain an index number.  Upon 
assignment of an index number, Respondents must be timely served.  Obtaining an index number 
can take several days or longer depending on the county. 
 
The list of required documents includes: 
 
● Notice of Petition  
○ Advising the respondent (the Parole Board) about the Article 78 petition, and 
identifying all papers upon which the Article 78 challenge is based.  
○ You select a return date 
○ Respondents must be served at least 20 days before the return date. 
 
● OR Order to Show Cause and accompanying affidavit (if bringing case in that manner) 
○ Advising the respondent (the Parole Board) about the Article 78 petition, and 
identifying all papers upon which the Article 78 challenge is based.  
○ The Order must first be presented to a judge and signed before it is served on the 
respondent.  
○ An Order to Show Cause must include an “Affidavit in Support of Order to Show 
Cause.”  
 
9 Pro se litigants have reported that all Supreme Court clerks across the state, no matter where the Art. 78 petition is 





● A Verified Petition 
○ Identifying the parties, the basis for the location that was selected, the facts of the 
case, the legal claims, the relief you are seeking, and other relevant information.  
○ A verification that swears to the truth of the statements in the petition, must be 
included, and the petition must be signed in front of a notary. 
 
● All exhibits and affidavits that support the petition 
 
● A filing fee of $305 
○ If an applicant is unable to afford the filing fee of $305, counsel should file an “in 
forma pauperis” application and pay a reduced filing fee between $15- $50 or 
zero pending the county of filing. Some counties require a notarized client 
statement as to assets; others accept an attorney statement pursuant to CPLR 
§1101(e). 
 
● “Request for Judicial Intervention” (RJI)  
○ A judge will not be assigned to the case unless an RJI is submitted with the 
application. Counties apply different rules regarding RJIs, so check that all 
requirements have been met with the court clerk. 
 
● “Request for an Index Number” 
○ Once the court provides an index number, this number must be written on all 
documents that are served on respondents or submitted to the court, or the court 
may dismiss the entire proceeding. 
 
Service: 
When filing an Article 78 petition, you should serve respondents—including the Parole Board, 
DOCCS and the Attorney General (the Attorney General represents the Parole Board in these 
proceedings)—each document and exhibit that was filed with the court. The index number and 
filing date must be present on the front page of each document for proper service. The name of 
the Judge and the return date should also be included if provided by the Clerk.  
 
If the petition was filed by OTSC, instructions for service are included in the Order to Show 
Cause and must be followed exactly Service must be completed by the date given on the 
Order to Show Cause and proof of service must be submitted to the court Clerk without 
delay within four months and fifteen days after the final decision from the administrative 
appeal. Therefore, service should be made as soon as possible after the index number is 
received.  
 
If the petition is filed by Notice of Petition, then service must be completed 20 days before the 
return date. CPLR §7804. 
 
Service is governed by CPLR §308.  
 




Once service is made, proof of that service must be filed with the court within four months and 
15 days of receiving the final decision from the administrative appeal. Proof of service is 
made through an affidavit of service filed with the court. See CPLR §306  
 
G. Board’s Answer and Petitioner’s Reply  
 
The Board, through its counsel, the Attorney General, is required to file and serve an answer and 
all attached documentary evidence no later than five days before the scheduled return date. 
CPLR §7804(e).  The Attorney General will likely seek your consent for additional time to 
answer.  While it is very likely the court will grant such a request with or without petitioner’s 
consent, we recommend you oppose the first request unless the AG will stipulate that no further 
requests for extension of time will be made.  Otherwise, successive requests will cause delays 
that risk an upcoming regularly scheduled parole review mooting the petition.  
 
If the answer contains new allegations that were not included in the original petition, you will 
need to address those in a reply, by either denying them or saying you do not know if they are 
true or not. If you do not respond to those issues, the court may view those facts as true. The 
reply must be submitted to the court and served to the respondent no later than one day before 




If an Article 78 petition is successful, the Judge will grant a de novo or new interview, also 
known as a “special consideration” interview. Courts currently do not have the power to grant 
parole, even if the Board of Parole was found to have violated the law.10  However, Judges can 
order the date by which the next interview must take place, whether certain commissioners are to 
be excluded from the new interview, whether certain documents can be considered by the Board, 
among other things.   
 
I. Appealing an Adverse Article 78 Ruling 
 
Unfortunately, denial of Article 78 petitions is relatively common at the Supreme Court level. An 
adverse ruling may be appealed to the appropriate appellate division. To appeal, a Notice of 
Appeal must be served upon the New York State Attorney General and filed with the 
Supreme Court that decided the case within thirty days of the entry of judgment denying 
the Article 78 petition.  
 
In general, if the appeal challenges factual findings of the lower court, those factual findings are 
reviewed for clear error, but if the material facts are not disputed and the appeal challenges the 
Supreme Court’s legal rulings based on those facts, the legal rulings are reviewed de novo, not 
with any deference.  For the most part, appeals to the Appellate Divisions from Article 78s are 
challenging legal conclusions made by the lower court, and so it is rarely appropriate for the 
Appellate Division to afford any deference to the lower court’s Article 78 decision.11 
 
 
10 See Kellogg v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 159 A.D.3d 439 (1st Dep’t 2018). 




Each appellate division has its own procedural rules, which are often quite complicated and will 
not be further explored in this manual.  
 
The Board may appeal the grant of an Art. 78, but there is an issue whether the Board may 
appeal as of right or must seek leave to appeal. The relevant inquiry is whether the Article 78 
decision is a “final judgment” of the kind described in CPLR 5701 (a)(1) and 7806 and 
accordingly appealable as of right to the Appellate Division, or is it a CPLR 5701 (b)(1) 
intermediate order in an article 78 proceeding.  The Board’s practice is to file a notice of appeal 
as of right and invoke an automatic stay pursuant to CPLR § 5519(a).  There is a question whether 
this stay provision should be applicable to Article 78 grants in the parole context, but there is no 
precedent to date.  
 
Should the Board appeal a favorable Article 78 decision and invoke the automatic stay, you 
could move to dismiss the appeal for failure to seek leave and/or seek an expedited appeal.  But, 
even an expedited appeal will be difficult to litigate before the next regularly scheduled parole 
review.   
 
Pending the issues on appeal and client-specific strategy, it is important to think through and 
discuss the pros and cons of forgoing the regularly scheduled parole review to avoid mooting the 
appeal. 
 
Should the Board appeal, consider engaging in negotiation with your adversary to determine 
which aspects of the decision are of concern to the Board.   On occasion, the Board can be 
convinced to withdraw the notice of appeal and enter into a stipulation modifying the conditions 
under which the de novo review must be conducted.    
 
VIII. THE EXECUTIVE LAW AND PAROLE REGULATIONS  
 
A. Executive Law and the Parole Decision  
 
The Parole Board is governed by New York’s Executive Law, which authorizes the Parole Board 
to promulgate regulations. Regulations have the force of law, if properly promulgated and 
consistent with the Executive Law. The Regulations are codified in 9 NYCRR 8000-8011.  
 
The relevant part of the Executive Law which governs the Parole Board is Section 259-i 
(N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i). 
  
Executive Law 259-i covers many of the functions of the Parole Board, such as when parole 
interviews should be conducted, what factors the Parole Board must consider when determining 
whether to grant parole, the obligations of the Parole Board if there is a denial, what happens 
when someone released to parole supervision has immigration issues, the procedures for 
revoking parole, and the procedures for handling parole appeals. 
  
It is critical to familiarize yourself with Executive Law 259-i(2)(a) and Executive Law 259-





Executive Law 259-i(2)(a): 
 
This section of the Executive Law requires the Parole Board to interview parole-eligible people 
at least one month before the parole eligibility date, and to set the next interview/review (“hold”) 
no later than 24 months from then if parole is denied. 
  
The important part of this section when writing an appeal is: 
 
“If parole is not granted upon such review, the inmate shall be informed in writing within two 
weeks of such appearance of the factors and reasons for such denial of parole. Such reasons 
shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms.” 
  
This part of the law requires the Parole Board to inform an applicant who has been denied parole 
of the reasons for the denial, in writing. The reasons must be explained in detail in the written 
decision, and cannot be “conclusory,” which means that evidence supporting the decision must 
be provided. 
 
If the Parole Board issues a decision that does not sufficiently explain the reasons for the parole 
denial, or does not refer to evidence in support of the decision, there is a basis for challenging 
that decision on appeal. 
 
Executive Law 259-i(2)(C)(A): 
 
Section 259-i(2)(C)(A) begins with: 
 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating 
the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.” 
  
Section 259-i(2)(C)(A) then lists the factors the Parole Board must consider when deciding 
whether to release someone to parole supervision.12 These factors are: 
 
(1) Achievements while incarcerated: “the institutional record including program goals and 
accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, 
therapy and interactions with staff and inmates” 
 




12 While case law provides that the Board need not give equal weight to each factor, it does mandate that each factor 
be considered.  Much parole litigation has centered around whether the Board actually considered, or merely paid lip 





(3) Post-release plans: “release plans including community resources, employment, education 
and training and support services available to the inmate” 
 
(4) Immigration issues: “any deportation order issued by the federal government against the 
inmate while in the custody of the department and any recommendation regarding deportation 
made by the commissioner of the department pursuant to section one hundred forty-seven of the 
correction law” 
 
(5) Victim statements: “any statement made to the board by the crime victim or the victim's 
representative, where the crime victim is deceased or is mentally or physically incapacitated” 
 
(6) Type/length of sentence: “the length of the determinate sentence to which the inmate would 
be subject had he or she received a sentence pursuant to section 70.70 or section 70.71 of the 
penal law for a felony defined in article two hundred twenty or article two hundred twenty-one of 
the penal law” 
 
(7) Seriousness of the offense: “the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type 
of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing court, the district 
attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration 
of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior to confinement” 
 
(8) Criminal history: “prior criminal record, including the nature and pattern of offenses, 
adjustment to any previous probation or parole supervision and institutional confinement.  
 
The board shall provide toll free telephone access for crime victims. In the case of an oral 
statement made in accordance with subdivision one of section 440.50 of the criminal procedure 
law, the parole board member shall present a written report of the statement to the parole board. 
A crime victim's representative shall mean the crime victim's closest surviving relative, the 
committee or guardian of such person, or the legal representative of any such person. Such 
statement submitted by the victim or victim's representative may include information concerning 
threatening or intimidating conduct toward the victim, the victim's representative, or the victim's 
family, made by the person sentenced and occurring after the sentencing. Such information may 
include, but need not be limited to, the threatening or intimidating conduct of any other person 
who or which is directed by the person sentenced.” 
 
B. Parole Regulations 
 
Guided by the Executive Law, the Parole Board has promulgated a host of regulations that have 
the force of law. It is critical to familiarize yourself with the relevant regulations. They cover, 
inter alia, the interview, post interview requirements and victim impact statements. See 9 
NYCRR 8000-8011. 
 
In 2017, the Parole Board made several important amendments to the regulations.  
 
8 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) reads, in part, “If a Board determination, denying release, departs from 




the Department Risk and Needs Assessment from which it departed and provide an 
individualized reason for such departure.” 
 
8 NYCRR § 8002.2(c) reads: 
 
Minor offenders: Guiding Principles. Minor offenders are inmates serving a maximum sentence 
of life imprisonment for a crime committed prior to the individual attaining 18 years of age. 
 
1. When making any parole release decision pursuant to section 259- i(2)(c)(A) of the 
Executive Law for a minor offender, the Board shall, consider the following: 
i. The diminished culpability of youth; and 
ii. Growth and maturity since the time of the commitment offense. 
2. Information presented that the hallmark features of youth were causative of, or 
contributing factors to, a minor offender’s commitment offense, should not, in itself, be 
construed to demonstrate lack of insight or minimization of the minor offender’s role in 
the commitment offense. The hallmark features of youth include immaturity, 
impetuosity, a failure to appreciate risks and consequences, and susceptibility to 
peer and familial pressures. 
 
Further, 8 NYCRR § 8002.3(b) reads, in part, “Reasons for the denial of parole release shall be 
given in detail, and shall, in factually individualized and non-conclusory terms, address how 
the applicable parole decision-making principles and factors listed in 8002.2 were considered in 
the individual’s case.” 
 
Notably, the regulation has removed the phrase “Discretionary release on parole shall not be 
granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined,” 
however this language remains in the Executive Law.  
 
Given these new additions to the Regulation, we believe that the Parole Board now has a higher 
standard to meet when making parole decisions. 
 
C. Standard of Review 
 
Decisions of the Board of Parole are discretionary and will be upheld so long as the Board 
complied with the statutory requirements. Executive Law § 259–i. Perea v. Stanford, 149 A.D.3d 
1392, 53 N.Y.S.3d 231 (3d Dep't 2017). (“Here, the Board considered the proper statutory 
factors, including the serious nature of petitioner's crime and his criminal history, prison 
disciplinary record, program accomplishments and post-release plan, as well as the COMPAS 
Risk and Needs Assessment instrument and the sentencing minutes … the Board also considered 
the order of deportation issued against him in rendering its decision.”) 
 
As with most administrative agencies, the courts are highly deferential to the Parole Board, and 
require much to disturb their findings. Given this discretion, a Court will only annul a denial of 
parole when it is “arbitrary and capricious,” and “irrational bordering on impropriety.” Russo v. 




responsibility for a difficult and complex function has been committed to it, there would have to 
be a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety before intervention would be warranted.”)  
 
D. The Decision and Transcript 
 
The Parole Board’s written decision is most often very brief, conclusory and not supported by 
what was actually said at the interview.  Do not focus solely on the decision itself.  Be sure to 
comb the transcript carefully for reasons to argue that the Board’s decision should be set aside. 
For example, the Board’s decision might state in conclusory fashion that the commissioners 
considered the person’s achievements, but review of the transcript reveals that no questions of 
that nature were actually asked, or that the questions took up one page of a thirty-page transcript.   
 
It is also likely the case that the transcript provides many grounds to challenge the Board’s 
decision even if those issues were not mentioned in the Board’s decision (i.e., if a Board member 
showed bias of some kind or asked questions that reflect a misunderstanding of the law or the 
facts of the underlying conviction). 
 
In addition, if there are past decisions and interview transcripts, be sure to read and analyze them 
closely.  Such records may reveal issues and facts that are not obvious from the current decision 
and transcript.  They may provide evidence that inappropriate information was considered in 
prior reviews, which guarantees the same information was considered in connection with the 
current denial.  Prior decisions and transcripts may provide evidence of irrationality as to the 
denial at issue.  For example, acknowledgement of a fact by a commissioner at a past interview 
that contradicts the basis for the current denial may support an argument that the basis for the 
denial is not supported by the record (i.e., at a previous interview the Commissioners commented 
on the person’s sincere remorse, but in the present interview they suggest the person is not 
sufficiently remorseful).  And, analysis of multiple denials may reveal patterns of bases for 
denial that are internally inconsistent thus rendering the current denial irrational.  Or past 
statements by commissioners that support a current claim that the same commissioners applied 
their personal penal philosophy. See King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788 
(1994) (holding that a Commissioner’s consideration of factors outside the scope of the 
applicable statute, including penal philosophy, the historical treatment of individuals convicted 
of murder, the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and the consequences to society 
if those sentences are not in place warranted a new parole review). 
  
E. Remedies Available 
 
The remedy for a finding of “irrationality bordering on impropriety” is a de novo parole 
interview.  Rossakis v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22 (1st Dep’t 2016) (“[w]hile the 
court is empowered to determine whether the administrative body acted arbitrarily, it may not 
usurp the administrative function by directing the agency to proceed in a specific manner, which 
is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the administrative body in the first instance.”); see 
also Kellogg v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 159 A.D.3d 439 (1st Dep’t 2018) (“The proper remedy 





Pending client-specific strategy, consider including a proposed order when filing your petition to 
better assure that should the petition be granted, a new review is ordered under specific 
conditions that will remedy the prior errors. It has been our experience that some Art. 78 
decisions granting a de novo review are less than clear as to how the review should be conducted.  
This will avoid ambiguity as to how the new review should be conducted and provide a cleaner 
record for contempt should the Board fail to abide by the de novo review conditions.   
 
IX. GENERAL ISSUES TO RAISE 
 
A. Denial Contained Conclusory Statements and Boilerplate Language 
 
The statute requires the Board to apply three standards of assessment:  
 
1. Is there “a reasonable probability that, if released, he will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law,  
2. and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and  
3. Release will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for 
law.”  
 
The statute also requires: 
 
“If parole is not granted upon such review, the inmate shall be informed in writing within 
two weeks of such appearance of the factors and reasons for such denial of parole.  Such 
reasons shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms” EL §259-i(2)(a). 
 
Yet, parole denial decisions routinely parrot the statutory language rather than explain in detail 
the reason for denial. For example, parole denials often state “Discretionary release is denied 
because release at this time would so deprecate the seriousness of the crime as to undermine 
respect for the law.” The Board’s reference to the statutory standard does not explain the denial.  
 
The Board’s failure to explain in detail why release would be incompatible with the welfare of 
society, OR explain in detail why release would so deprecate the seriousness of the offense as to 
undermine respect for the law, OR to explain in detail why if released there is a reasonable 
probability that the parole applicant would violate the law, are each grounds for annulling the 
denial and granting a de novo interview/review.  
 
Case law dictates that the Parole Board’s written decision is improper if it fails to explain the 
reasons for denial of parole “in detail and not in conclusory terms.” N.Y. Exec. Law. 259-i(2)(a); 
Rossakis v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22 (1st Dep’t 2016); Ramirez v. Evans, 118 
A.D.3d 707 (2d Dep’t 2014). Though it need not discuss each factor in detail, a written decision 
“may not summarily itemize a petitioner’s achievements while incarcerated or render a 
conclusory decision parroting the statutory standard.” Coaxum v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 14 
Misc.3d 661 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2006).  
 
The written decision must provide some basis to determine how the factors were weighed and 




process of determining which factors outweigh others: a balancing process.”). See also Platten v. 
N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 47 Misc. 3d 1059 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty. 2015). (“Based on the record 
and the lack of specificity in the decision, the Court cannot determine what concern the board 
had for the public safety and welfare, and why it had that concern at the time of the interview in 
2014.”); Weinstein v. Dennison, 7 Misc. 3d 1009A (Sup. Ct. NY Cnty, 2005) (“…the Board is 
required to do more than merely mouth the statutory criteria, particularly whereas here each 
factor recited and brought forth in the parole interview, other than the crime itself, militated in 
favor of release.”); V. Sullivan v. NYS Bd of Parole, 100865/18 (Sup. Ct., NY Cnty, 2019) 
(Board’s conclusions that petitioner’s release would be incompatible with welfare of society and 
would deprecate the seriousness of the crime and therefore undermine respect for the law merely 
track the statutory language, without explanation or context…thus, the Court cannot evaluate 
their rationality.”)   
 
In addition, the Parole Board Regulations 9 NYCRR 8002.3 were revised in 2017 to state:  
 
“Reasons for the denial of parole release shall be given in detail, and shall, in factually 
individualized and non-conclusory terms, address how the applicable parole 
decision-making principles and factors listed in 8002.2 were considered in the 
individual’s case.”  
 
This is a significant change because arguably the Board must now explain more than the reason 
for denial, it must explain in detail how each “principle and factor” was factored into that 
decision.   
 
And, the Regulations were revised in 2017 to also state:  
 
“If a Board determination, denying release, departs from the Department Risk and Needs 
Assessment’s scores, the Board shall specify any scale within the Department Risk and 
Needs Assessment from which it departed and provide an individualized reason for such 
departure.” 9 NYCRR 8002.2(a).  
 
These revisions became effective in September of 2017.  Case law construing the new 
regulations include: 
 
Comfort v. Stanford, 2018/1445 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty, 2018) (finding the Board did not 
comply with 8002.2(a) by failing to explain its departure from the lowest possible COMPAS risk 
scores of felony violence, arrest and absconding yet concluding that there was a reasonable 
probability the petitioner would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law.);  
 
Diaz v. Stanford, 2017/53088 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty 2018) (noting the upcoming changes in 
the regulations and finding the denial decision did not explain the stark contrast between the 
COMPAS scores and the Board’s conclusion.); 
 
Matter of Coleman v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 157 A.D.3d 672, 673 
(2d Dep’t 2018) (reversing denial of Art. 78 petition because “the petitioner . . . was assessed 




Alternative Sanction) risk assessment.   Thus, a review of the record demonstrates that in light of 
all of the factors, notwithstanding the seriousness of the underlying offense, the Parole Board's 
‘determination to deny the petitioner release on parole evinced irrationality bordering on 
impropriety.’”);  
 
Robinson v. Stanford, No. 2392/2018, at *2 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Mar. 13, 2019) (ordering de 
novo interview for man with two murder convictions and low COMPAS scores because “the 
Parole Board’s finding that discretionary release would not be compatible with the welfare of 
society directly contradicts these scores in his COMPAS assessment.  As the Board’s 
determination denying release departed from these risks and needs assessment scores, pursuant 
to 9 NYCRR § 8002.2 it was required to articulate with specificity the particular scale in any 
needs and assessment from which it was departing and provide an individualized reason for such 
departure.  The Board’s conclusory statement that it considered statutory factors, including 
petitioner’s risk to the community, rehabilitation efforts and needs for successful community re-
entry in finding that discretionary release would not be compatible with the welfare of society 
fails to meet this standard.  As such, its determination denying parole release was affected by an 
error of law.”) (emphasis added) 
 
Even before revision of the regulations, the First Department held that the Parole Board violated 
the statutory requirement that the reasons for denial not be conclusory when they “summarily 
listed petitioner's institutional achievements and then denied parole with no further analysis of 
them.” Rossakis v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22 (1st Dep’t 2016). A court will look at 
the plain text of the parole denial to determine if it is merely boilerplate language. See In re 
Ciaprazi v. Evans, 52 Misc.3d 1212(A) (Sup. Ct., NY Cnty, 2016) (“A plain and fair reading of 
the respondent's decision to deny parole leads to the inescapable conclusion that it is a simple 
regurgitation of standard boilerplate parole board denial language.”); Ruzas v. New York State 
Board of Parole, No. 1456/2016, slip op. at 4 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Oct. 18, 2017) (holding the 
Board in contempt for conducting defective de novo interview after the Court set aside the initial 
decision because “the Board summarily denied [petitioner’s] application without any explanation 
other than by reiterating the laundry list of statutory factors.  The minimal attention, barely lip 
service, given to these factors and to the COMPAS Assessment cannot be justified given the 
amount of time already served.”); 
 
The Board must provide insight into how it reached its decision, instead of merely listing the 
factors it considered. In re McBride v. Evans, 42 Misc.3d 1230A (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty, 2014) 
(“While the Board discussed petitioner's positive activities and accomplishments at the hearing, 
it then concluded that his release was incompatible with ‘public safety and welfare.’ The Board 
gave no analysis as to how or why it reached this conclusion. It appears to have focused only on 
petitioner's past behavior without articulating a rational basis for reaching its conclusion that his 
release would be incompatible with the welfare of society at this time.”) (emphasis added.) 
See Morris v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 40 Misc.3d 226 (Sup. Ct. Columbia 
Cnty, 2013) (“the Board failed to explain, other than the facts of the crime, why petitioner's 
release was ‘incompatible with the public safety and welfare’ and why there was ‘a reasonable 
probability [he] would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law.’ … the Board 
‘should be well able to articulate the reasoning’ for its decision, ‘if it were come to reasonably, 




Slip Op. 50899(U), at *2 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. June 9, 2014) (granting de novo interview after 
noting that petitioner’s “COMPAS report found him at low risks in all categories it considered. . 
. . Although the determination parrots the applicable statutory language, the Board does not even 
attempt to explain the disconnect between its conclusion and petitioner’s rehabilitation efforts 
and his low risk scores.”). 
 
B. Failure to Consider Full Record / Board Failed to “Qualitatively Weigh” the 
Applicable Factors 
 
While the Board is required to consider each applicable statutory factor, “the Board is ‘not 
required to give equal weight to each of the statutory factors’ but, rather, may ‘place...greater 
emphasis on the severity of the crimes than on the other statutory factors.’”  Fischer v. Graziano, 
130 A.D.3d 1470 (4th Dep’t 2015); Peralta v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 
N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dep't 2018); Moore v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 1375 (3d Dep't 
2016). 
 
Considering relevant statutory factors requires more than a mere reference to “the record.”  For 
example, a categorical dismissal of achievements is grounds for overturning the Board’s 
decisions. In Cappiello, eight out of ten pages of the applicant’s interview transcript were 
dedicated to the details of the applicant’s instant offense, a murder that occurred in 1976. While 
the applicant directed the Board’s attention to the numerous factors supporting parole release, 
“there is no indication in the record as to whether the commissioners read those materials or 
considered them in any way.” Cappiello v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 6 Misc.3d 1010A (Sup. Ct., 
NY Cnty, 2004). The parole denial merely stated “After a review of the record and this interview 
parole is again denied” before listing the details of the instant offense and concluding that “your 
release at this time would pose a threat to public safety.” Cappiello, 6 Misc.3d 1010(A). (“When 
the record of the Parole hearing fails to convincingly demonstrate that the Parole Board … 
qualitatively weigh[ed] the relevant factors in light of the three statutorily acceptable standards 
for denying parole release, the decision is arbitrary and capricious.”)  
 
See Johnson v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838 (4th Dep’t 2009) (“the record is devoid 
of any indication that the Parole Board in fact considered the statutory factors that weighed in 
favor of petitioner's release … In fact, during the notably truncated hearing, the Parole Board 
focused on matters unrelated to any statutory factor.”) See also Pulinario v. N.Y. State Dep’t of 
Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 42 Misc.3d 1232(A) (Sup. Ct. NY Cnty, 2014) (“[T]he Parole 
Board's overwhelming emphasis was on the offense … At the hearing, there were only passing 
references to the contents of petitioner's application. In the decision there was only a perfunctory 
mention of all the statutory factors that weighed in Pulinario's favor.”); Coaxum v. N.Y. State Bd. 
of Parole, 14 Misc.3d 661 (2006) holding “actual consideration of factors means more than 
acknowledging that evidence of them was before the Board.”; V. Sullivan v. NYS Bd of Parole, 
100865/18 (S. Ct., NY Cnty, 2019) (“There is no explanation why the 25 year old crime 
outweighed the voluminous evidence that indicates petitioner would presently be able to lead a 
quiet and crime-free life in society.”).  
 





When the Board bases its decision on assertions not supported by the record, or an inaccurate 
record, these are grounds for annulling the denial and granting a de novo interview. Rivera v. 
Stanford, 2019 WL 2030503, at *2 (2d Dep’t 2019) (Board's finding that release was not 
compatible with the welfare of society based upon prison disciplinary record was without 
support in the record); Coleman v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 157 
A.D.3d 672, 673 (2d Dep’t 2018) (“Contrary to the Parole Board's determination that the 
petitioner ‘distance[d]’ himself from the crime, the record demonstrates that the petitioner took 
full responsibility for his actions…”). 
 
The Board is required to rely on a “fair view” of the record.  In Rossakis, the Board 
“inappropriately relied on claims in decedent's family's victim impact statements that were 
affirmatively rebutted by the objective evidence supporting petitioner's release,” such as their 
claim that the petitioner would have nowhere to go when released when “the record makes clear 
that petitioner had secured a job offer and was taking concrete steps to secure housing.” Rossakis 
v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22 (1st Dep’t 2016). 
 
In Hawthorne, the court granted petitioner a de novo interview based on the Board’s 
“characterization of the petitioner's disciplinary history as showing ‘marginal compliance with 
DOCCS rules,’ which it strongly relied upon in denying parole, lacked support in the record.” 
There, petitioner’s only DOCCS violation occurred “during a period in which, through no fault 
of his own and due to the recommendation of a prison physician, the petitioner was deprived of 
medication for his mental illness.” The court ultimately held that "for the Board to . . . rely upon 
petitioner's conduct during [a] psychotic crisis . . . as a primary ground for denying his release is 
so inherently unfair and unreasonable that it meets the high standard . . . warranting our 
intervention." Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d. 1036 (3d Dep’t 2016). 
 
If the Board based its decision on erroneous information, this is grounds for a de novo hearing. 
See Lewis v. Travis, 9 A.D.3d 800 (3d Dep’t 2004). (“Board incorrectly referred to petitioner's 
conviction as murder in the first degree, when, in fact, petitioner was convicted of murder in the 
second degree. Inasmuch as the Board relied on incorrect information in denying petitioner's 
request for parole release, the judgment must be reversed and a new hearing granted.”) 
(emphasis added.)  
 
See Edge v. Hammock, 80 A.D.2d 953 (3d Dep’t 1981). (“Because Parole Board based its 
determination of petitioner's minimum period of imprisonment (MPI) on rape and sodomy, 
crimes he had not been convicted of and which he denied committing, Special Term properly 
annulled board's determination.”) 
 
But see Booth v. Stanford, 2014/570 (Sup. Ct. Franklin Cnty 2015) (“Based upon the foregoing, 
the Court concludes that any possible error in the COMPAS numerical scoring of petitioner’s 
‘Prison Misconduct’ record was harmless in view of the Board’s obvious familiarity with 
petitioner’s disciplinary record.”) 
 
A common inaccuracy, though not litigated as yet, is a claim by the Board that there is “official 
opposition” from the DA and/or sentencing court, when in fact the opposition is dated and does 




the sentencing court.  The Board solicits a letter from the DA, defense counsel (at trial) and the 
sentencing judge at the time of first parole eligibility.  See 259-i.  Typically, the Board relies on 
that letter at each subsequent parole review and frequently cites to such opposition.  But, that is 
often inaccurate because the opposition is dated and may, as to the DA, reflect the views of a 
past administration.  For example, recently elected Kings County DA Eric Gonzalez has 
committed to a policy that includes the following: “For cases that ended in a guilty plea, our 
default position will now be that the defendant generally should be released at his or her first 
parole opportunity (subject to his or her record in prison and other considerations.”  And, calls 
for special consideration of those who committed their crimes as juveniles and up to age 23.13 
 
Note that if the Board does not contact trial defense counsel, the DA or the sentencing Judge, it is 
likely grounds for a de novo interview. 
 
D. The Denial of Parole Amounted to an Illegal Resentencing 
 
The role of determining sentences is left to the legislature that enacted the minimum and 
maximum permissible sentence for the crime of conviction, and by the judge who imposed the 
sentence. In considering whether to grant parole, the Parole Board is limited to determining 
whether release at the present time is appropriate under the statutory standards.  King v. N.Y. 
State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 (1st Dep’t 1994) (“The role of the Parole Board is not to 
resentence petitioner according to the personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate 
penalty for murder, but to determine whether, as of this moment, given all the relevant statutory 
factors, he should be released.”) (emphasis added.).  Nevertheless, many courts have been 
reluctant to find that multiple parole denials amount to unlawful resentencing, even when the 
person seeking parole was sentenced by the judge to a term of imprisonment that was less than 
the maximum permitted by law (e.g. a person facing a maximum of 25 to life was sentenced to 
15 to life and yet is repeatedly denied parole based primarily on the seriousness of the crime).  
This is an area ripe for continued litigation. Ely v. Bd of Parole, 2016/100407 (Sup. Ct. NY Cnty, 
2017) (“Petitioner's COMPAS Assessment, lack of a prior criminal record, age, infirmity, 
lengthy imprisonment to date, clear expression of remorse, acceptance of responsibility for her 
crime, post-release plans, the many letters submitted by corrections professionals in support of 
her release, and the many positive initiatives she undertook during her incarceration, indicate that 
respondent's denial of release was more in the nature of a re-sentencing, and that no amount of 
evidence of rehabilitation would have outweighed its interest in retribution.”). 
 
Be especially attuned to this issue if your client was convicted at trial of multiple crimes, but 
acquitted of others; a parole denial may in effect be the imposition of more time because the 
Board believes your client was guilty of all the charged conduct.    
 
E. The Board’s Consideration/Reliance on Confidential Information was Not 
Disclosed in its Decision  
 
Until recently and contrary to law, the Board withheld from the parole applicant many portions 
of the parole case record.  Although that has changed, there are still significant parts of the parole 






and medical summaries. At a minimum, however, the Board’s consideration of such secret 
information should be disclosed in the interview or decision.  In re West v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 41 Misc.3d 1214(A) (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2013). (“The mandate that a victim impact 
statement ‘shall be maintained in confidence’ (9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.4(e)) certainly should not 
trump the statutory requirement that the Board's decision reveal the factors and reasons it 
considered in reaching its decision, particularly when such consideration is mandated by 
statute.”).  For more on obtaining the full parole case record, see below. 
 
X. FAILURE TO CONSIDER STATUTORY FACTORS 
 
A. Exclusive Focus on Nature of the Instant Offense 
 
The 1st, 2nd and 4th Departments hold that the Board must consider all statutory requirements and 
cannot base the decision to deny solely on the nature of the crime.  See King v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 433 (1st Dept 1993), aff'd, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994) (“…the 
legislature has determined that a murder conviction per se should not preclude parole, there must 
be a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the crime 
itself.); Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 27 (1st Dept 2016) (Holding 
the Board acted irrationally in focusing exclusively on the seriousness of petitioner's conviction 
and the decedent's family's victim impact statements…without giving genuine consideration to 
petitioner's remorse, institutional achievements, release plan, and her lack of any prior violent 
criminal history.); V. Sullivan v. NYS Bd of Parole, 2018/100865 (S. Ct., NY Cnty, 2019) 
(finding Board relied almost exclusively on the seriousness of the crime and statements 
petitioner made at time of sentence); Ramirez v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 707 (2d Dept 2014); Perfetto 
v. Evans, 112 A.D.3d 640 (2d Dep’t 2013); Gelsomino v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 82 A.D.3d 
1097 (2d Dep’t 2011) (“Here, in denying the petitioner's application for release on parole, the 
Parole Board cited only the circumstances of the underlying crimes and failed to mention any of 
the other statutory factors, including his excellent disciplinary record, his record of achievements 
while incarcerated, as well as positive statements made by the sentencing court.”); Huntley v. 
Evans, 77 A.D.3d 945 (2d Dep’t 2011) (“Where the Parole Board denies release to parole solely 
on the basis of the seriousness of the offense, in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, it 
acts irrationally.”); Mitchell v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 58 A.D.3d 742 (2d Dep’t 2009)( While 
the seriousness of the underlying offense remains acutely relevant in determining whether the 
petitioner should be released on parole, the record supports the petitioner's contention that the 
Parole Board failed to take other relevant statutory factors into account.); Johnson v. New York 
State Div. of Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838, 839 (4th Dept 2009) 
   
The 3rd Dept takes a different position. See Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268 (3d Dept 2014) (“This Court has repeatedly held—both recently and historically—
that, so long as the Board considers the factors enumerated in the statute, it is ‘entitled . . . to 
place a greater emphasis on the gravity of [the] crime,’” and stating that the 1st Department’s 
holding in King that the Board may not deny discretionary release based solely on the nature of 
the crime when the remaining statutory factors are considered only to be dismissed as not 





But, lower court decisions in the 3d Department have interpreted the holding of Hamilton 
otherwise. See Rabenbauer v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 46 Misc.3d 603 
(Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty. 2014) (The holding in Hamilton “…does not mean administrative parole 
decisions are virtually un-reviewable.”); Platten v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 47 Misc. 3d 1059 
(Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty. 2015) (“A parole board cannot base its decision to deny parole 
release solely on the serious nature of the underlying crime. The Hamilton decision did not affect 
this prohibition.”) (citations omitted); but see Torres v. Stanford, 50 Misc. 3d 1207A (Sup. Ct. 
Franklin Cnty 2015) (finding that Hamilton effectively determined that the “aggravating 
circumstances” requirement enunciated by the First Department in King does not represent the 
state of the law in the Third Department.)  
 
B. Aggravating Factors  
 
Among the factors the Executive Law requires the Board to consider is the following:   
 
“the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type of sentence, length of 
sentence and recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney 
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating 
and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior to confinement” 
 
In King, the First Department held that “Certainly every murder conviction is inherently a matter 
of the utmost seriousness since it reflects the unjustifiable taking and tragic loss of a human life. 
Since, however, the Legislature has determined that a murder conviction per se should not 
preclude parole, there must be a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the 
inherent seriousness of the crime itself.” In re King v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 
(1st Dep’t 1993), affd. 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994). 
 
In Guzman, the First Department upheld a parole denial after concluding that “[r]espondent did 
find ‘some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the crime itself’ … 
e.g., that petitioner was on parole when he committed the crime.” In re Guzman v. Dennison, 32 
A.D.3d 798 (1st Dept 2016). See also Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 22 (1st Dept 2007) 
(“As to the seriousness of the crime, we strongly disagree with petitioner's implication that the 
nature of his crime was no more heinous than any other murder, the implication being that the 
denial of his application is inconsistent with the grant of parole to others convicted of murder…. 
petitioner's crimes went well beyond the “unjustifiable taking and tragic loss of human life that 
describes every murder…Petitioner, while employed as a police officer, corruptly embarked on a 
pattern of extortion, in the course of which he committed a cold-blooded double homicide and 
shot a witness. His crimes were committed through the use and perversion of the power of his 
position as a New York City police officer, and, as such, violated the very fabric of our system of 
law and justice. Given this context, the Board's concession that petitioner was an exemplary 
inmate who is now unlikely to pose a danger to the community did not necessarily outweigh the 
horrifying nature of the acts surrounding his crimes.”); Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
239 A.D.2d 235, 240 (1st Dept 1997) (“…in light of the truly dreadful facts of this crime, there is 
no question that the record supports a determination that the extremely serious nature of the 
crime so outweighs petitioner's impressive accomplishments while in prison as to warrant a 




“heinous,” yet still holding that denial of parole was arbitrary and capricious because the Board’s 
decision did not explain why release would be inconsistent with the welfare of society or 
deprecate the seriousness of the offense).      
 
C. Failure to Consider Youthfulness at the Time of Crime 
 
Based on neurological evidence showing that teenagers are more impulsive, more lacking in 
foresight, and more susceptible to social pressure than adults, the US Supreme Court held that 
life sentences without the possibility for parole for people convicted of crimes as juveniles 
violates the Eighth Amendment. A person serving an indeterminate sentence for a crime 
committed as a juvenile is therefore constitutionally required to be given a “meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012); Montgomery 
v Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736.  
 
The Appellate Division, 3d Department, found that it is “axiomatic that [a juvenile offender] still 
has a substantive constitutional right not to be punished with life imprisonment for a crime 
‘reflect[ing] transient immaturity’” and held that “[a] parole board is no more entitled to subject 
an offender to the penalty of life in prison in contravention of this rule than is a legislature or a 
sentencing court.” In re Hawkins v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 140 A.D.3d 
34 (3d Dept 2016). (“For those persons convicted of crimes committed as juveniles who, but for 
a favorable parole determination will be punished by life in prison, the Board must consider 
youth and its attendant characteristics in relationship to the commission of the crime at issue.”) 
See also Putland v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 158 A.D.3d 633 (2d Dep’t 
2018) (“The petitioner is entitled to a meaningful opportunity for release in which the Parole 
Board considers, inter alia, his youth at the time of the commission of the crimes and its 
attendant circumstances.”); Rivera v. Stanford, 2019 WL 2030503 (2d Dep’t 2019). 
 
The Board attempted to codify this holding in 2017 at 8 NYCRR § 8002.2(c) which reads: 
 
Minor offenders: Guiding Principles. Minor offenders are inmates serving a maximum 
sentence of life imprisonment for a crime committed prior to the individual attaining 18 
years of age. 
 
1. When making any parole release decision pursuant to section 259- i(2)(c)(A) of the 
Executive Law for a minor offender, the Board shall, consider the following: 
i. The diminished culpability of youth; and 
ii. Growth and maturity since the time of the commitment offense. 
2. Information presented that the hallmark features of youth were causative of, or 
contributing factors to, a minor offender’s commitment offense, should not, in itself, be 
construed to demonstrate lack of insight or minimization of the minor offender’s role in 
the commitment offense. The hallmark features of youth include immaturity, 
impetuosity, a failure to appreciate risks and consequences, and susceptibility to 





Although the law specifically applies to people under the age of 18 at the time of their offense, 
attorneys across the country are pushing courts to extend the logic of Roper et al to people 
convicted of crimes committed in their early 20s. We similarly encourage attorneys in New York 
State to make these arguments even if the person was over 17. 
 
D. Failure to Consider Immigration Status or Impending Deportation 
 
Immigration status, including an impending deportation order is a statutorily required factor for 
the Board of Parole to consider. N.Y. Exec. Law. 259-i(2)(C)(A)(4). Failure to consider an 
impending deportation order is grounds for a de novo interview and review.  See Thwaites v. N.Y. 
State Bd. of Parole, 34 Misc. 3d 694 (Sup. Ct. Orange Cnty, 2011); Ciaprazi v. Evans, 52 
Misc.3d 1212(A) (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty, 2016). 
 
Although convictions and incarceration have a significant impact on immigration status, some 
people in prison may still have a path to citizenship or temporary status. Unless the client is 
absolutely certain and clear that they wish to be deported back to their home country, attorneys 
should work with immigration specialists to determine what, if any, avenues clients may have to 
challenge orders of deportation.  
 
E. Failure to Consider Sentencing Minutes 
 
The Third Department held harmless the Board’s failure to consider available sentencing minutes 
“given that the sentencing minutes do not disclose that the sentencing court made any 
recommendations concerning parole.” In re Matos v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 87 A.D.3d 
1193 (3d Dep’t 2011).  
 
However, the Third Department also held that “the failure to timely locate available sentencing 
minutes” by the Board, in which “the sentencing judge nonetheless implicitly addressed [parole] 
by discussing in some detail his discomfort with the required maximum range of the sentence 
(i.e., life in prison) and then imposing less than the maximum on the lower range where he had 
discretion,” was a violation of Executive Law § 259-i and grounds for a de novo hearing. In re 
Duffy v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 132 A.D.3d 1207 (3d Dep’t 2015). See 
also Matter of Phifer v. New York State Bd, of Parole, 2019 N.Y> Slip Op. 32462(U), at *6 (Sup. 
Ct. NY Cty. Aug. 21, 2019) where the Board failed to consider the sentencing minutes and the 
court ordered a de novo interview. 
 
F. Lack of Consideration of or Failure to Justify Departure From COMPAS 
 
In 2011, the New York State legislature mandated that the Board establish a more forward-
looking approach to parole consideration by amending the statute to require “written 
procedures…incorporat[ing] risk and needs principles…” People v. Brown, 25 N.Y.3d 247 
(2015). In response, the Board adopted a risk assessment instrument and developed procedures 





The instrument, the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanction 
(“COMPAS”), was developed by Northpointe Institute for Public Management Inc.14   It is 
administered by an applicant’s Offender Rehabilitation Counselor (ORC) and currently consists 
of 74 questions. Answers are tallied and applicants are given a score of low, medium, or high, 
indicating the levels of risk as to an array of factors bearing upon public safety if released. 
 
In line with the 2011 legislative changes, the parole regulations were revised to read: “in making 
a release determination, the Board shall be guided by risk and needs principles.” 9 NYCRR 
8002.2.  
 
Failure to perform a risk and needs assessment, such as COMPAS, as required by the regulatory 
scheme, is grounds for a de novo interview. Malerba v. Evans, 109 A.D.3d 1067 (3d Dep’t 
2013); In re Garfield v. Evans, 108 A.D.3d 830 (3d Dep’t 2013). 
 
The Board must also qualitatively consider the risk and needs assessment, and there must be 
evidence of consideration. Diaz v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 976 N.Y.S. 2d 838 (Sup. Ct. 
Cayuga Cnty. 2013) (“[T]here is no indication in the parole hearing minutes, the Board's 
decision, or anywhere else in the record that the commissioners charged with weighing 
Petitioner's release even viewed, much less considered, the COMPAS risk assessment in making 
their determination … The mere existence of a COMPAS risk assessment in an inmate’s file, as 
here, is not enough. There must be some indication that the Board complied with the statute by 
considering the results of the COMPAS in reaching its decision.”) 
 
In September 2017, additional amendments to the Parole regulations require that “If a Board 
determination, denying release, departs from the Department Risk and Needs Assessment scores, 
the Board shall specify any scale within the Department Risk and Needs Assessment from which 
it departed and provide an individualized reason for such departure.”  
 
In the above section “Denial Contained Conclusory Statements and Boilerplate Language,” we 
list emerging case law, including Comfort v. Stanford, 2018/1445 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty) 
(finding the Board did not comply with 8002.2(a) by failing to explain its departure from the 
lowest possible COMPAS risk scores of felony violence, arrest and absconding yet concluding 
that there was a reasonable probability the petitioner would not live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law.); Diaz v. Stanford, 2017/53088 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty 2018) (noting the 
upcoming changes in the regulations and finding the denial decision did not explain the stark 
contrast between the COMPAS scores and the Board’s conclusion.) 
 
G. Failure to Consider or Request a Statement from Defense Counsel 
 
The Executive Law requires that the Board consider “the seriousness of the offense with due 
consideration to…the recommendations of the attorney who represented the inmate in 
connection with the conviction for which the inmate is currently incarcerated.” 
 
 





Not uncommonly, the Board will fail to effectively reach out to a client’s criminal defense 
attorney in the underlying case. Such a failure has resulted in more than a few administrative 
reversals. Attorneys should try to contact defense attorneys to inquire whether the Board 
requested their opinion about the former client’s parole appearance. If the defense attorney 
received nothing from the Board, persuade the attorney to write something supportive and then 
raise the issue on administrative appeal.   
 
H. Failure to Consider Victim Statements 
 
The Board is statutorily required to consider victim statements. In Bottom, though the adult son 
of one of the slain victims appeared at a victim impact meeting and spoke, at length, in favor of 
release, “respondent's subsequent decision makes no mention of that statement … In fact, 
respondent affirmatively cited the negative impact of petitioner's actions upon the victims' 
families as one justification for denying him parole.”  Bottom v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 30 
A.D.3d 657, 658 (3d Dep’t 2006). The Third Department held that, “[w]hile we appreciate that 
respondent may weigh the relevant factors … as it sees fit and need not discuss each factor in its 
decision where, as here, it is provided with a compelling victim impact statement which 
advocates for the release of the prospective parolee, explicit reference to such an exceptional 
submission would facilitate ‘intelligent appellate review’ of respondent's required compliance 
with” the Executive Law. In re Bottom, 30 A.D.3d at 658. 
 
For more information, see below at XIII-C regarding consideration of opposition material. 
 
I. Failure to consider reentry plan 
 
The Board must consider applicant’s release and reentry plan. See Executive Law 259-i(c)(A) 
(iii) (“release plans including community resources, employment, education and training and 
support services available to the inmate…shall be considered.”).  Often, when the Board focuses 
during the interview almost exclusively on the seriousness of the crime of conviction, there is 
virtually no reference to the person’s reentry plan, or a Board member merely says something 
like “We note your reentry plan.”  Either situation presents grounds for a de novo. 
 
XI. NON-STATUTORY FACTOR ISSUES 
 
Whether the Board may consider information outside the statutory factors varies depending on 
the category of information. The Third Department suggests that so long as the information 
directly relates to an enumerated factor, then consideration is appropriate.  The First Department 
has held that information “outside the scope” of the statutory factors may not be considered.   
 
A. Lack of Remorse 
 
The Parole Board is allowed to consider parole applicants’ remorse (or lack thereof) and insight 
into their crime in their decision. Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470 (2000) (“We conclude that it 
was neither arbitrary nor capricious for the Board to consider remorse and insight into the 
offense following petitioner's Alford plea. These factors, we recognize, are not enumerated in the 




incompatible with the welfare of society. Thus, there is a strong rehabilitative component in the 
statute that may be given effect by considering remorse and insight.”); Dudley v. Travis, 227 
A.D.2d 863 (3d Dep’t 1996). (“Petitioner contends that the Board's determination constituted an 
abuse of discretion because it was based on the … petitioner's lack of remorse, the brutality and 
depravity of the offense and petitioner's prior history of mental illness. We disagree. We find the 
consideration of these matters to be entirely appropriate in a determination denying parole taken 
together, they directly relate to the statutory standards that govern the Board's decision.”) See 
also Bockeno v. New York State Parole Bd., 227 A.D.2d 751 (3d Dep’t 1996); Walker v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 203 A.D.2d 757 (3d Dep’t 1994).  
 
However, when the interview transcript indicates that the parole applicant repeatedly 
demonstrated remorse, the Board cannot base their decision to deny on “lack of remorse.”  
Wallman v. Travis, 18 A.D.3d 304 (1st Dep’t 2005). (“[T]he Board's perfunctory discussion of 
petitioner's alleged lack of insight is contrary to the Court of Appeals' decision … which held 
that a petitioner's remorse and insight into his crimes are highly relevant in evaluating an 
inmate's rehabilitative progress … Despite the critical significance of these factors in evaluating 
an inmate … the Board's decision in this case offers no supportive facts justifying its finding of 
lack of insight and remorse … [Thus] the court's conclusions regarding lack of insight and 
remorse were based on an inaccurate reading of the record.”); Winchell v. Evans, 27 Misc.3d 
1232(A) (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty, 2010) (Board’s denial, which was based on the petitioner 
failing to show remorse for the victim or her family and not appearing to understand the 
seriousness of his crime was contradicted by the record). 
 
B. Penal Philosophy 
 
A Parole decision is invalid when “one of the Commissioners considered factors outside the 
scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy, the historical treatment of individuals 
convicted of murder, the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and the consequences 
to society if those sentences are not in place.” In re King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 
N.Y.2d 788 (1994). (emphasis added.) Executive Law § 259-i does not authorize Commissioners 
to consider such factors.  Be creative when thinking about whether any commissioner questions 
or comments during the interview, or any material considered by the Board (i.e., see below re: 
“Community Opposition”), constitutes consideration of “penal philosophy.”   
 
C. Improper Consideration of Letters in Opposition to Release 
 
In denying parole, many transcripts and decisions cite to so-called “community opposition.”15 
Consideration of such information can be challenged.  
 
 
15 The use of the term “community opposition” is misleading and not a term parole applicant lawyers should adopt.  
Community suggests that the opposition reflects a consensus of a relevant group of persons that the Board is 
statutorily required or authorized to consider.  Based on the limited documents falling within this category that 
lawyers for parole applicants have been permitted to view, such information consists of petitions signed by random 
people, letters containing inaccurate information and letters from those without any knowledge relevant to the 
factors the Board must consider. In some cases, upon special review, no “community opposition” existed in the file, 




Under the Executive Law, the Parole Board shall consider “any current or prior statement made 
to the board by the crime victim or the victim's representative, where the crime victim is 
deceased” or is mentally or physically unable. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(2)(v). The 
Executive Law goes on to define “victim’s representative” as “the crime victim’s closest 
surviving relative, the committee or guardian of such person, or the legal representative of any 
such person.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(2)(viii).  
 
The issue is whether the Board may consider opposition from individuals and associations that 
do not fall within the definition of a victim representative.  A recent 3d Department decision held 
that the Board may and the 1st Department arguably states the same, but there is still room for 
litigation on this front.   
 
In Applewhite v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 167 A.D.3d 1380 (3d Dep’t 2018), appeal 
dismissed, 32 N.Y.3d 1219 (2019), the 3d Department stated: 
 
“Contrary to petitioner's contention, we do not find that respondent's consideration of 
certain unspecified “consistent community opposition” to his parole release was outside 
the scope of the relevant statutory factors that may be taken into account in rendering a 
parole release determination (see Executive Law § 259–i). Executive Law § 259–i 
specifically contemplates that community members are free to express their opinion to 
respondent regarding the potential release of inmates on parole (see Executive Law § 
259–i[2][c][B]; 9 NYCRR 8000.5[c][2]). Specifically, Executive Law § 259–i(2)(c)(B) 
provides, in relevant part, that “[w]here a crime victim or victim's representative ... or 
other person submits to [respondent] a written statement concerning the release of an 
inmate, [respondent] shall keep that individual's name and address confidential” 
(emphasis added). The corresponding regulation governing parole records demonstrates 
why limiting access to information and protecting confidentiality in such a manner is 
paramount; such limitations are essential in order to, among other things, “protect the 
internal process by which division [of parole] personnel assist [respondent] in 
formulating individual decisions with respect to inmates and releasees” and “to permit 
private citizens to express freely their opinions for or against an individual's parole” (9 
NYCRR 8000.5[c][2]; see Matter of Jordan v. Hammock, 86 A.D.2d 725, 725, 447 
N.Y.S.2d 44 [1982], appeal dismissed 57 N.Y.2d 674, ––– N.Y.S.2d ––––, ––– N.E.2d –
––– [1982]; see also Matter of Grigger v. New York State Div. of Parole, 11 A.D.3d at 
852–853, 783 N.Y.S.2d 689). By statutorily protecting the confidentiality of those 
members of the community – in addition to the crime victim or victim's representative – 
who choose to express their opinion, either for or against, an inmate's bid to obtain parole 
release, the Legislature demonstrated a clear intent that such opinions are a factor that 
may be considered by respondent in rendering its ultimate parole release decision. 
Significantly, such statements and opinions are germane to respondent's determination as 
to whether an inmate will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, whether 
such release is compatible with the welfare of society and whether an inmate's release 
will deprecate the seriousness of the underlying crime as to undermine respect for the law 
– statutory factors that respondent must consider in rendering its parole release 




Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531, 531–32, 89 N.Y.S.3d 134, 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 08071, *1 
[2018] ).” 
 
In 2018 the 1st Department stated that “…in the initial consideration of petitioner's request for 
parole, the Board permissibly considered letters in opposition to the parole application submitted 
by public officials and members of the community, the Board admitted that its refusal to provide 
petitioner with access to any of the those letters in connection with her administrative appeal was 
improper.” Clark v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531 (1st Dept 2018).   
 
The contents of the opposition material is not specified in the Clark and Applewhite decisions; 
therefore pending the content of the material in your clients’ parole files, this may provide a 
ground for appeal.16   
 
For example, if the opposition material is limited to conveying “penal philosophy” then it should 
not be considered. King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 433 (1st Dept 
1993), aff'd, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994).  The “opposition” material may also be stale.  See Hopps v. 
N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, Decision and Order Index No. 2553/18 (Sup. Ct. Orange Cnty. 2018) 
(“the only evidence in the record or otherwise submitted to the Court that might be argued to 
constitute [official opposition] are statements made by the victim’s sister at the time of 
sentencing (some 25 years ago), and documents generated around the same time … the Court 
finds no even relatively current information that would support a finding that there was ‘official 
opposition and significant and persuasive community opposition on file.’ … it is irrationality 
bordering on impropriety for the Board to deny parole based on statements about the Petitioner’s 
suitability for release at or around the time of the underlying offense, some 25 years ago.”).  
 
Another argument may be that so called “community opposition” may only indicate the 
organizing abilities and resources of one sector of society.17  That parole applicants do not have 
the resources to organize an on-line campaign to solicit letters of support does not mean that an 
equal number of members of society would not support release.  Therefore, is it accurate for the 
Board to state that there is “community opposition” when such opposition emanates from a select 
sector of the New York “community?” 
 
Relatedly, there may be an argument that since the law does not permit such pressure at the 
sentencing stage, why should such information be considered at the parole stage?  See Criminal 
Procedure Law §380.50 (limiting those who can speak at sentence to victims or their family, 
legal guardian or representatives with personal knowledge of and relationship with the victim) 
and CPL §390.30 (limiting scope of pre-sentence investigation report).  
 
In addition, reliance on “opposition” that is generated by efforts akin to political campaigning, 
reduces the Board to counting votes and succumbing to political pressure.  Therefore, such 
“opposition” may be beyond the statutory factors delineated in Exec. L. 259-i et seq and the 
 
16 See e.g. New York City Police Benevolent Association website advocating that “cop killers” should never be 
released and soliciting opposition letters advocating such.  https://www.nycpba.org/ 
17 For example, the NYC PBA’s website permits anyone to write a form letter to the Board opposing release of “cop 





Board’s consideration of such requires reversal.  But see Krebs v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
2009 WL 2567779, at 12 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009) (“Plaintiff's claim that denial of parole based 
on adverse public and political pressure violates the equal protection clause is equally unavailing. 
These pressures are permissible factors which parole officials may properly consider as they 
relate to ‘whether release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of the offense as to undermine respect for the law.’” citing Seltzer v. 
Thomas, 2003 WL 21744084, at 4 (S.D.N.Y.  2003) (quoting Morel, 2003 WL 21488017 at *5).) 
 
In addition, there may be an argument that the Board inappropriately considered opposition from 
outside New York State.  When the Board cites to “community opposition,” it sometimes claims 
“the community still suffers from your crime,” or words to that effect. But is the opinion of a 
non-New York state resident relevant? In re Clark provides an instance where “community 
opposition” was unreasonable. There, the Parole Board “considered a strong letter in opposition 
from a legislative body that sits more than 300 miles away from both the place of the crime and 
the current location of [the applicant’s] incarceration.” The Court held “[s]uch a letter, sent to the 
Parole Board … should fall outside the scope of reasonable community opposition; yet, the 
Parole Board read it into the record and appeared to have given it serious weight, nonetheless.” 
Clark v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2018 WL 1988851 (N.Y.Sup.) (Sup. Ct. New York Cnty 
2018), affm’g as modified 16AD3d 531 (1st Dep’t 2018).18 
 
Finally, there is a strong argument that consideration of opposition material is not permitted 
under the governing statute.  In Matter of Applewhite v. NYS Bd. of Parole, 167 A.D.3d 1380 (3d 
Dept. 2018), a divided panel held that the Board of Parole may consider community opposition 
to a parole candidate’s release.  Without offering a legal rationale, the First Department reached 
the same conclusion in Matter of Clark v. NYS Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531 (1st Dept. 2018).  
The Applewhite majority found support for this holding in a relatively minor amendment to 
Executive Law § 259-i (c) (2) enacted in 1999.  The 1999 amendment authorized the Board to 
keep confidential the names and addresses of a “crime victim or victim’s representative . . . or 
other person [who] submits to the parole board a written statement concerning the release of an 
inmate” (emphasis added).  Seizing upon the reference to “other person,” the court concluded 
that “[b]y statutorily protecting the confidentiality of these members of the community – in 
addition the crime victim or victim’s representative – who choose to express their opinion, either 
for or against an inmate’s bid to obtain parole release, the Legislature demonstrated a clear intent 
that such opinions are a factor that may be considered by [the Board] in rendering its ultimate 
parole release decision” (emphasis added).    
 
The two dissenting justices disagreed, relying on the plain language of Executive Law § 259-i 
(2)(C)(A), which includes a detailed list of the factors that may be considered in the parole 
release decision-making process.  The statute authorizes the Board to consider statements of 
crime victims and their representatives, but notably fails to mention statements expressing 
community opposition to a parole candidate’s release.  The dissenting justices stressed that the 
statute “includes detailed language defining the specific, limited circumstances in which non-
victims may make statements to [the Board] solely as victim’s representatives, describes 
 
18  There is a question whether the 1st Department’s affirmance that included the statement: “… the Board 
permissibly considered letters in opposition to the parole application submitted by public officials and members of 




information that may be included in victim impact statements, and directs [the Board] to 
maintain such statements on file, but includes no mention of statements from anyone other than a 
victim or a representative.”  Thus, “[u]nder well-established rules of statutory construction,” the 
dissent concluded, “the Legislature’s failure to include materials provided by community 
members among the factors to be considered by [the Board] must be understood to reveal that the 
exclusion was intentional.” 167 A.D.3d at 1385.   
 
Applewhite was granted parole release a few weeks after the Appellate Division’s decision and 
his appeal as-of-right to the Court of Appeals was later dismissed as moot.  Therefore, until the 
Court of Appeals rules otherwise, Applewhite is controlling law in the Third Department and 
Clark is controlling in the First Department.  (While Clark held that community opposition 
material can properly be considered by the Board, the court importantly ruled that it was error to 
deny the petitioner access to these letters in connection with her administrative appeal from the 
denial of parole.) 
 
Standing alone, the Applewhite majority’s reliance on the 1999 amendment concerning the 
confidentiality of names and addresses of “other person[s]” who submit letters in opposition to a 
parole candidate’s release would appear to be a logically thin basis on which to conclude that the 
legislature intended community opposition to be weighed in the parole decision-making process.  
After all, the Legislature expressly amended the Executive Law in 1985 in order to authorize 
consideration of the statements of crime victims and their representatives, and the Board later 
promulgated detailed conforming regulations regarding submission and consideration of such 
material in the parole release decision-making process.  See 9 NYCRR 8002.4.  But the 
legislature has never taken similar action with respect to community opposition material, and the 
Board’s regulations include no direct references to it.       
 
But the Applewhite majority reasoned that legislative intent was bolstered and made plain by a 
“corresponding regulation governing [restricted access to] parole records” (emphasis added).  
The majority concluded that 9 NYCRR 8005 (2) demonstrates “why limiting access to 
information and protecting confidentiality is paramount.”  The regulation states that restricting 
access to certain parole records is necessary, among other reasons, “to permit private citizens to 
express freely their opinions for or against an individual’s parole.”  Here, the majority 
concluded, was a clear indication that the legislature intended the Board to review and consider 
community opposition material in the parole release decision-making process.   
 
The flaw in the Applewhite majority’s legal analysis is that the quoted regulation [9 NYCRR 
8005 (2)] was adopted in 1978 – some twenty years before the 1999 amendment under 
consideration.  And the 1978 regulation merely expressed the Board’s unwritten policy to 
consider community opposition letters in the decision-making process.  It was not enacted in 
response to any legislative direction concerning the type of information that should be 
considered at parole hearings. In fact, before 1985 the Board of Parole had no statutory authority 
to consider victim impact submissions in the parole decision-making process. Only unwritten 
agency policy supported the Board’s consideration of such statements.  
 
That situation changed in 1985 when the legislature amended Executive Law § 259-i (2)(C) to 




that must be considered in parole release decision-making process.  The governor’s bill memo in 
support of the legislation noted that the amendment supplied legislative authorization for what 
had been a longstanding policy of the Board: 
 
The Division of Parole has long had a policy of considering the views of 
crime victims in rendering its decisions.  Nevertheless, it is now 
appropriate to formalize that policy by granting crime victims a statutory 
right to express their views concerning the parole release of an inmate.  
This bill would permit crime victims, or their representatives, to provide 
the Board of Parole with a written expression of their views and would 
require that the Board consider those views, together with other factors 
enumerated in the Executive Law, when rendering a decision to grant or 
deny release.19  
  
Voicing support for the bill, J. Marc Hannibal, counsel to the Division of Parole, pointed out that 
Board policy was, in fact, broader than the legislative enactment and more generally included 
consideration of the “views of persons in the community” (i.e., community opposition) in the 
decision-making process: 
 
Please be advised that the Division supports this bill and urges the 
Governor to sign it.  The Board of Parole has historically maintained a 
policy of considering the written view of persons in the community when 
rendering a decision to grant or deny parole release.  Therefore, the 
proposed statutory amendment is fully in conformity with that policy and 
is welcomed by the Board.20     
 
Thus, while the legislature acted in 1985 to provide statutory authorization for the Board’s policy 
of considering the views of crime victims in the decision-making process, it did not authorize or 
otherwise endorse the Board’s broader policy of considering community opposition material.  To 
this day, the Board considers such material according to its own internal policy – not pursuant to 
any grant of authority from the legislature.      
 
The 1999 amendment making confidential the names and addresses of crime victims and “other 
persons” was uncontroversial. The bill passed unanimously in the Assembly and Senate 
(S.1126/99, A.5515/99 – L.1999, chap. 40).  Nothing in the bill text gave any hint that its 
purpose was to broaden the list of factors that may be considered in the parole release decision-
making process.  The bill memo stated its straightforward purpose was to “provide a necessary 
protection to crime victims, their representatives and others potentially affected by the release of 
an inmate” (emphasis added).  The bill was likely proposed by the Division of Parole itself and 
so the vague reference to “other persons” may have been a quiet nod to the Board’s longstanding 
policy of considering community opposition material.  Or perhaps it wasn’t.  The statute is 
unclear.   
 
 
19 Governor’s memo in support Program Bill #12 (L.1985, chap. 78). 
20 Letter from J. Marc Hannibal to Gerald C. Crotty, Counsel to the Governor, dated April 30, 1985, Bill Jacket to 




What is clear is that majority decision in Matter of Applewhite v. NYS Bd. of Parole, 167 A.D.3d 
1380 (3d Dept. 2018), was based, in part, on a faulty premise: that a 1978 regulation expressing 
the Board’s unwritten policy regarding community opposition somehow establishes the “clear 
intent” of the legislature to authorize consideration of such material.  As the dissenting justices 
correctly observed, the clearest indication of legislative intent are the words of a statute.  And 
Executive Law §259-i (2)(C)(A) fails to include community opposition among the factors to be 
considered in the parole release decision-making process.  Fuller consideration and proper 
resolution of this important question will have to await review by the New York State Court of 
Appeals.21   
 
D. Personal Opinion or Bias of Commissioners 
 
Commissioners may not base their decision on personal opinion or bias.  Rabenbauer v. N.Y. 
State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 46 Misc. 3d 603 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty. 2014) (“The 
Commissioners based their decision to deny parole release to petitioner solely on their personal 
opinions of the nature of the instant offense and improper characterizations of petitioner's actions 
immediately following the murder . . . and at least one Commissioner was argumentative and 
appeared to have made the decision prior to the parole interview. … There is no additional 
rationale, other than the Board's opinion of the heinous nature of the instant offense, and 
personal beliefs and speculations, to justify the denial of parole release.”) (emphasis added.) 
 
In considering whether to grant parole, the Parole Board is limited to determining whether the 
person is a present danger to society.  King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 
(1st Dep’t 1994) (“The role of the Parole Board is not to resentence petitioner according to the 
personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate penalty for murder, but to determine 
whether, as of this moment, given all the relevant statutory factors, he should be released.”) 
(emphasis added.) 
 
A commissioner’s statement of his own opinion about the appropriate sentence violates 
Executive Law §259-i.  Almonor v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 16 Misc.3d 1126(A) (Sup. Ct. 
New York Cnty. 2007) (“the Court notes the short length of the parole hearing, the 
Commissioners' unwillingness to discuss petitioner's letters in support of his application and, in 
particular, Commissioner Rodriguez's comment suggesting that he thought petitioner's sentence 
for manslaughter was too short.”) 
 
Mischaracterization of the instant offense and comments indicating no amount of punishment 
would be enough render the decisions denying parole irrational.  Bruetsch v. New York State 
Dep’t of Corrections and Community Supervision, 43 Misc.3d 1223(A) (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty. 
2014) (“[S]everal passages in the transcript … suggest that the board viewed this crime as 
premeditated, completely mischaracterizing the incident as understood by the trial court and jury. 
Another comment indicates the board was of the opinion that Petitioner could never make 
amends for killing his wife.”) 
 
E. Predetermined Decision 
 
 




Indications that the parole denial was predetermined is a ground for a de novo interview. See  
King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, affd. 83 N.Y.2d 788. See Johnson v. 
N.Y. Bd. of Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838 (4th Dep’t 2009) (“We therefore conclude on the record 
before us that the Parole Board failed to weigh all of the relevant statutory factors and that there 
is ‘a strong indication that the denial of petitioner's application was a foregone conclusion.’”) 
 
See Rabenbauer v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 46 Misc. 3d 603 (Sup. Ct. 
Sullivan Cnty. 2014) (“at least one Commissioner was argumentative and appeared to have made 
the decision prior to the parole interview.”) See also Morris v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. 
Supervision, 40 Misc.3d 226 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Cnty. 2013) (“When, as here, the Parole Board 
focuses entirely on the nature of Petitioner's crime, there is a strong indication that the denial of 
parole is a foregone conclusion that does not comport with statutory requirements.”) (emphasis 
added.) 
 
XII. ASPIRATIONAL LITIGATION / ON THE HORIZON  
 
A. Judicial Power to Grant Release  
 
There are numerous decisions holding that an Article 78 court does not have the power to order 
release and its power is limited to ordering annulment of the denial and a new review. Yet, the 
reasoning for such holdings is scant.   
 
In Ruzas v. DOCCS, an unpublished Dutchess County Article 78 decision, Judge Grossman all 
but begged for a reexamination of the Article 78 judge’s power to fashion a remedy other than de 
novo review. See Ruzas v. Stanford, No. 1456/2016, at *7 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty., Oct. 18, 
2017) (unpublished op.). Judge Engoron, New York County, in granting an Article 78, went so 
far as to order release but was reversed by the Appellate Division. Kellogg v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 159 A.D.3d 439, 442 (1st Dep’t, 2018). This is an area of administrative law that could 
use some careful research to determine if there are bases to challenge this long-held conclusion.  
Might deference to the administrative agency not apply in the context of deprivation of liberty?  
Applicable case law could include: Matter of Hines v. State Board of Parole, 293 NY 254 
(1944); Matter of King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994); Friedgood v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 22 A.D.3d 950, 802 N.Y.S.2d 268 (3d Dep't, 
2005); Quartararov. New York State Div. of Parole, 224 A.D.2d 266 (1st Dep't 1996); Brunner 
v. Russi, 182 A.D.2d 1136 (4th Dep't 1992); Matter of Rossakis v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 29 (1st Dept. 2016); Matter of Newton v. Dennison, 47 A.D.3d 538 
(1st Dept. 2008).  
 
C. Right to Disclosure of Full Record Considered by the Board 
 
This is a critical issue in which litigation may make a difference. As explained in more detail in 
sections below, the Board routinely withholds portions of the parole file from the parole 
applicant.  Barring strategic reasons for not doing so, administrative appeals and Article 78 
petitions should challenge the Board’s withholding from the applicant any portions of the parole 




category of information that is lawfully withheld, and even as to this category, the law may 
support only the withholding of the author’s name and address.   
 
D. Deprecate Standard is Unconstitutionally Vague 
 
For those serving a maximum of life, the statutory standard most often invoked as the basis for 
denial is that release at this time would “so deprecate the seriousness of the crime as to 
undermine respect for the law.”  Exec Law 259-i. Neither the Board nor case law has construed 
the meaning of this standard.  As is, there are no contours to its application.  Might there be 
grounds to challenge the statute on its face or as applied on vagueness grounds? Undoubtedly, 
there are obstacles.   
 
Vagueness is usually considered a due process argument, but there is precedent barring due 
process claims in the context of parole. Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 
75–76 (1980) (“Petitioner has demonstrated no protected liberty interest which would implicate 
the due process guarantee.”). But, commentators have queried whether the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Sessions v. Dimaya may have broadened the void for the vagueness doctrine. 
See http://blog.federaldefendersny.org/more-on-dimaya/ (“Gorsuch's concurrence... includes a 
strong defense of the void-for-vagueness doctrine under originalist principles as a ‘faithful 
expression of ancient due process and separation of powers principles the framers recognized as 
vital to ordered liberty.’”). 
 
Alternatively, there is an argument that the standard is so vague and inexplicable that its 
application is inherently arbitrary and capricious. Or relatedly, for the same reason, its 
application is inherently an abuse of discretion. See CPLR §7803(3) (“…whether a determination 
was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and 
capricious or an abuse of discretion, including abuse of discretion as to the measure or mode of 
penalty or discipline imposed.”). 
 
A vagueness, arbitrary and capricious or abuse of discretion argument may be especially 
compelling when a denial occurs after service of a minimum sentence set below the statutory 
minimum. If, for example, the sentencing judge determined that parole consideration would be 
appropriate after service of 15 years (when the law permitted up to a 25-year minimum 
sentence), then how does the Board explain why release after service of the minimum (or 
multiple years past the minimum) undermines respect for the law?  Similarly, the Board should 
be required to explain why release after service of the minimum set at the statutory maximum 
would undermine respect for the law when the legislature has determined that release to parole 
supervision at that point is lawful. 
 
E. Criminal History 
 
The law requires the Board to consider “prior criminal record, including the nature and pattern of 
offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole supervision and institutional 
confinement.” Executive Law 259-i(2)(c)(A)(viii).  In denying parole, the Board often cites to an 
applicant’s violation of a prior probationary sentence, or commission of the instant offense while 




incorrigible and unworthy of parole. This conduct, however, has taken place decades ago. The 
Board does not consider the many intervening years in prison and good disciplinary records 
indicate adjustment and capacity to succeed on parole now. The Board should be required to 
state in detail and with specificity the inference they are drawing from criminal histories that 
occurred long ago.   
 
Consideration of criminal history closer in time to the instant offense may be rational, and 
therefore, this consideration has applicability as to lower indeterminate sentences. For example, 
prior criminal history may be relevant as to a person sentenced to probation, who then reoffends 
while on probation and is given an indeterminate sentence of 2 to 4 years.  At the parole review, 
after service of two years, consideration of failure to benefit from probation may have some 
relevancy. But, since passage of the statute requiring the Board to consider this factor, far fewer 
indeterminate sentences are meted out. The majority of people serving indeterminate sentences 
have life on the top and many years on the bottom. According undue weight to criminal history is 
irrational when there has been many intervening years and indicia of change. 
 
F. Irrationality of Short Adjournment and a Subsequent Denial 
 
Until recently, denials of parole almost always resulted in a “hold” of 24 months until the next 
review, though the Board has discretion to set a shorter time frame.  Recently, for some 
applicants, the Board has set the hold at 18 and sometimes 12 months, without explanation. The 
exercise of discretion in setting a shorter time for the next review has to indicate, at the very 
least, that the Board has determined that a person is nearing what the Board consider “readiness 
for release.”    
 
Therefore, when the next review 12 or 18 months later results in a denial, assuming the record is 
the same or better, there is a basis to argue irrationality, or that a more detailed and specific 
reason for denial is necessary to explain the setting of the shorter period and yet another denial.  
 
G. 6th Amendment Violations 
 
Pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and its progeny, including the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision, United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019), there may 
be a basis to challenge a parole denial on a 6th Amendment ground, especially if your client was 
a juvenile at the time of the crime.   
 
Clients who were juveniles at the time of the crime must be given a “meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48 (2010).  A parole denial concluding that release would deprecate the seriousness of the 
offense as to undermine respect for the law or be incompatible with societal welfare, imposes a 
greater sentence by finding facts that such clients are among the rarest juveniles whose crimes 
reflect permanent incorrigibility—facts not found beyond a doubt by a jury nor admitted by plea. 
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.   
 
For others, findings of fact by the Board about the commitment offense that were not elements of 




Board relies to conclude that release would undermine respect for the law or be incompatible 
with societal welfare raises the minimum sentence in violation of the 6th Amendment.  
 
As argued by counsel representing Mr. Flores in Flores v. Stanford, No. 7:18-cv-02468 (VB) 
(S.D.N.Y.): 
 
“In Haymond, the Supreme Court held that a supervised release statute that requires imposition 
of a minimum sentence, above the minimum for the crime for which the jury convicted the 
defendant, upon a judicial finding under a preponderance of the evidence standard without a jury, 
violated the Sixth Amendment.  Id., slip op. at 1, 10-11 (plurality opinion).  The Court rejected 
the argument that, because this sentence enhancement arose in the posture of “postjudgment 
sentence-administration proceedings”, the Sixth Amendment was inapplicable.  Id. at 11-12.  The 
Court explicitly stated:  “[A]ny increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on 
the finding of a fact requires a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt no matter what the 
government chooses to call the exercise.”  Id. at 12 (citation omitted).  
 
For juvenile lifers, the legally prescribed floor for the original conviction is a term of years set by 
New York State law together with the entitlement, under the Court’s Eighth Amendment cases, 
to a meaningful opportunity for parole upon demonstration of maturity and rehabilitation.  It is 
unconstitutional for the Parole B oard to deny parole based on new fact-finding about the 
original offense because, as the Court reaffirmed last week, that “remove[s] from the jury the 
assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties.”  Id. at 9 (citation omitted).  
Unlike parole revocation hearings, which the Court distinguished because the sentence “could 
not exceed the remaining balance of the term of imprisonment already authorized by the jury’s 
verdict”, id. at 7, denial of parole to juvenile lifers based on fact-finding about the original 
offense is an enhancement to the sentencing floor to which the Sixth Amendment applies.”    
 
XIII. OTHER LITIGATION STRATEGIES 
 
A. Contempt Cases Following Successful Article 78 Petitions 
 
If an applicant successfully appeals a parole denial through an Article 78 petition, but is again 
denied release at the de novo interview, limited remedies are available. An applicant may begin 
the appeals process again from the administrative level, or file a contempt motion against the 
Board of Parole.22  
 
In a civil contempt motion, the petitioner alleges that the Board failed to follow the Article 78 
Court’s order to hold a de novo review free of the unlawfulness that infected the prior review.  
The crux of this claim is that the Board has provided a “de novo” interview in name only, while 




22 A seemingly cut and dry civil contempt claim could be made if the Board refuses to grant a new interview 
whatsoever, after a judge has so ordered. There do not seem to be any cases in which it is alleged that the Board 
refused to reschedule an interview after a successful Article 78 filing, although the Board has certainly taken its time 




Trial judges have demonstrated willingness to grant contempt motions and some have been 
upheld on appeal.  See Ferrante v. Stanford, 2019 WL 1925915 (2d Dept 2019) (“Even though 
the Board purported to comply with its responsibilities to consider the requisite statutory factors, 
we agree with the Supreme Court's conclusion, made after a hearing, that the record in this 
particular case demonstrates that the Board again denied parole release exclusively on the basis 
of the underlying conviction without having given genuine consideration to the statutory 
factors.”). 
 
Therefore, civil contempt may be a promising strategy to combat the Board’s exhibited 
resistance to providing meaningful relief to parole applicants who have filed successful Article 
78 claims—or at least to begin to apply increased pressure on the Board.   
 
i. Legal Standard 
 
A motion to hold the Board in contempt is filed in the original Article 78 case and before the 
judge that granted the Article 78 petition. The movant petitioner bears the burden of proving, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that the Parole Board “violated a clear and unequivocal court 
order thereby prejudicing his rights.” Cassidy v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 140 A.D.3d 953 
(2d Dep’t 2016) (reversing Article 78 court’s finding of contempt holding the underlying order 
was not clear and unambiguous); Banks v. Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 145 (2d Dep’t 2018) 
(“Applying our well-established contempt jurisprudence, it cannot be said that the language 
employed in the judgment dated May 14, 2015, was clear and unambiguous since the Board 
could have reasonably understood and interpreted the judgment as directing it to conduct a de 
novo interview consistent with the requirements of the controlling statutory language. Contempt 
findings are inappropriate where, as here, there can be a legitimate disagreement about what the 
terms of an order or judgment actually mean.”)  
 
The elements of civil contempt are often-cited as follows: 
 
 “First, there must be a lawful order of the court in effect clearly expressing an 
unequivocal mandate. Second it must appear with reasonable certainty that the court’s 
mandate has been disobeyed. Third, the party to be held in contempt must have had 
knowledge of the court’s order. And fourth, the violation of the court’s order must be 
shown to impede, impair, or prejudice the rights of another party.” Matter of Banks v. 
Stanford, 159 AD3d 134 (2d Dep’t, 2018) (citing Matter of McCormick v. Axelrod, 59 
N.Y.2d 574 (Ct. App. 1983), amended on other grounds 60 N.Y.2d 652 (Ct. App. 1983)).  
 
ii. Remedy for Contempt 
 
A finding of contempt may lead to the imposition of fines or imprisonment. The Second 
Department has stated that, upon a finding of contempt, “the fixing of an appropriate remedy[] is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the motion court upon consideration of the surrounding 
circumstances.” Banks, 2018 WL 736148, at 6.  But, the Banks court further held that the Article 
78 court was without jurisdiction to annul the denial of parole that resulted from the de novo 
review. Banks v. Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 147 (2d Dep’t 2018) (“There is nothing in the record 




determination, or commenced a separate CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking judicial review of 
the determination. The only application before the court was the petitioner's motion seeking 
statutory remedies for contempt (see Judiciary Law § 753[A]). The remedies for contempt differ 
from the equitable mandamus remedies available in CPLR article 78 proceedings.”).  
 
In the parole context, Article 78 judges have ordered monetary fines upon making their findings. 
For example, in Ferrante, supra, the Art. 78 judge ordered the Board to pay $500 for every day it 
remained in contempt, but this portion of the decision was reversed by the 2d Dep’t.  Instead, the 
2d Dept ordered, “…where actual damages were not established, the petitioner may recover 
reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees, plus a statutory fine in the sum of 
$250.”  
 
Judges may also order reimbursement of “reasonable fees and costs” associated with the 
contempt motion. See Ruzas v. Stanford, No. 1456/2016, at *7 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty., Oct. 18, 
2017) (unpublished op.).  To date, no judge has ordered imprisonment of the Parole Board 
Commissioner as a remedy for a finding of contempt.  
 
iii. Contempt Cases in the Parole Context 
 
In May 2016, Judge Maria Rosa, Dutchess County Supreme Court, held the Parole Board in 
contempt of her order that followed a successful Article 78 challenge by applicant John 
MacKenzie. In the de novo interview ordered by Judge Rosa, the Board again denied parole in a 
brief, boilerplate decision. After the denial, the court granted a contempt motion, finding that the 
Board’s second decision was “virtually the same” as its earlier decision, which in turn had been 
“entirely unsupported by the factual record.”  Judge Rosa’s contempt finding ordered yet another 
de novo interview, but MacKenzie was again denied parole.  He committed suicide in August 
2016 after 10 parole denials. 
  
In Ruzas v. Stanford, Judge Grossman, Dutchess County Supreme Court, granted a motion for 
civil contempt. The court found that the de novo interview was not held within the ordered 60-
day timeframe, the Board failed to focus on rehabilitation as ordered, and considered opposition 
from persons and entities not statutorily authorized to be considered in violation of the order. A 
de novo review was ordered at which Ruzas was granted parole.  Although the Board filed a 
notice of appeal, it never perfected the appeal. Ruzas v. Stanford, No. 1456/2016, at *7 (Sup. Ct. 




In rare cases, a client may be granted parole, but in the time between the interview and release, a 
new fact or intervening cause arises and the Board may suspend the release date. The Board will 
then hold a rescission hearing to determine whether to reinstate the open date for release, or 
rescind the grant of parole and hold the client for an addition term.  
 
In order to hold a rescission hearing, the Board must provide the client with a Notice of 




hearing is held, the Board must also produce and provide a Rescission Hearing Report and any 
supporting documents.  
 
Causes of rescission can include: new information not previously known to the Board (such as 
newly submitted letter from the district attorney), a new disciplinary ticket or conviction, 
removal from a program, changes in mental health, etc. Except see Costello v. New York State 
Bd. Of Parole, 23 N.Y.3d 1002 (2014), in which the Court of Appeals clarified that victim impact 
statements received after parole is granted are not a valid basis to rescind parole (i.e., they must 
be considered before the initial decision). 
 
Contact the authors of this guide for more guidance on rescission hearings.  
 
XV. THE PAROLE BOARD FILE, OTHER DOCUMENTS AND HOW TO GET THEM 
 
The Parole Board maintains a file for every applicant who appears before it. If your client 
requested their parole file before the parole interview, they can provide you with copies. If not 
(and it is unlikely that they did), it is important to obtain the file for the administrative appeal and 
Article 78. If your client requested the parole file before their interview/review and did not 
receive it or portions of it, this may be an issue to raise in the administrative appeal and Article 
78.  
 
A. Parole File Contents 
 
• Pre-sentence report 
• Sentencing minutes 
• Programming history 
• All Program certificates and evaluation forms 
• Disciplinary records 
• Grievance Reports challenging disciplinary tickets 
• COMPAS (portions are routinely redacted)23 
• Current and prior Parole Board decisions 
• Current and prior transcripts of Parole Board interviews 
• ORC recommended Special Conditions 
• Current and past Case Plans 
• Comprehensive Medical Summary Form 
 
23 In 2011, the New York State legislature amended the Executive Law governing parole to require the Board to 
“establish written procedures . . . . incorporat[ing] risk and needs principles . . . .” The amendment required the 
Board to adopt and utilize an empirically validated risk assessment and to develop procedures for how to use such a 
tool. To fulfill the requirement set out by the legislature, the Board selected an evaluative instrument called 
Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanction (“COMPAS”) developed by Northpointe 
Institute for Public Management Inc. COMPAS is administered by an applicant’s Offender Rehabilitation Counselor 
and currently consists of 74 questions. Answers are tallied and applicants are given a final score of low, medium, or 
high, indicating the level of risk they pose to public safety upon release. Many applicants report that the ORCs who 
administer the evaluations frequently make mistakes and misreport information, especially regarding an applicant’s 
prior criminal history, disciplinary record, and family support. As ORCs often only give applicants their COMPAS 
reports days before their Parole Board interviews, there is little time and no viable process for correcting errors. 




• Parole Board Medical Summary 
• Proposed Residence Form 
• Pre-Release Screening Worksheet 
• Parole Board Report (aka Inmate Status Report)24 
• Commissioner’s Worksheet 
• Parole Packet (i.e. client’s submission, if applicable) 
• Letter(s) from trial level defense attorney 
• Letter(s) from the District Attorney  
• Letters/statements from victims and their families 
• “Community Opposition” letters 
• Letter(s) from Sentencing Court 
• Past administrative appeal decisions 
  
B. Law re: Obtaining the Parole File 
 
Part 8000.5 of the regulations governing the “Division of Parole” requires the Board to keep and 
disclose certain records to parole applicants.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8000.5 et. seq. Specifically, the 
Board is commanded to “obtain and file” records pertaining to parole applicants, including, 
among other records, the nature and circumstances of the crime for which each applicant was 
sentenced, copies of such probation reports as may have been made, and reports on each 
applicant’s social, physical, mental, and psychiatric condition.  8000.5 (a)(b). These records, 
known commonly as the “parole file,” are provided to the Board when it considers parole and 
serve as an important basis for its decisions. 
 
A parole applicant’s access to the parole file is governed by the same regulation. In general, the 
applicant or their attorney “shall be granted access only to those portions of the case records 
which will be considered by the board…at a hearing or pursuant to an administrative appeal of a 
final decision of the board.”  While there are exceptions listed under 8000.5 (c)(2)(a)(b), the 
Board withholds many portions of the parole file inappropriately.  
 
C. Process for Obtaining the Parole File 
 
The process to request the parole file is outlined in 8000.5 and a new DOCCS Directive #2014 
dated June, 2019, but it is only sometimes followed. The best practice is to request the parole file 
as soon as possible in the context of an administrative appeal.  
 
i. Contact the facility where your client is incarcerated to determine the 
person to whom the record request should be sent (usually the Senior 
Offender Rehabilitation Counselor or Senior Parole Officer) 
ii. Draft the request 
1. See attached for a sample request 
 
24 An unnumbered three-page report; one page, designated “confidential report,” which may contain “intelligence 





2. Include your client’s “DIN” number, current facility, and the 
nature of the proceeding for which you are requesting the parole 
file, in this case the administrative appeal. 
3. Request the parole file pursuant to the regulations governing parole 
reviews, §8000.5. Make clear this is not a FOIL request and object 
to DOCCS treating it as such.   
4. In addition, the request should include a demand that any 
documents withheld should be individually identified and the 
specific basis under §8000.5 for withholding should be stated.  If 
the applicant is aware of support letters submitted by DOCCS 
employees, a request for confirmation of their receipt should be 
included as well.  
iii. Include a Signed Authorization  
1. Include an authorization for disclose signed by your client. See 
attached for sample.  
iv. Send the request electronically 
1. All prisons should now accept requests for these files 
electronically. If they do not, please contact the authors.  
 
A. Preservation of Issue for Appeal and Alternative Avenue to Litigate Non-
Disclosure 
 
It is important to preserve inappropriate withholding of portions of the parole file for the 
administrative appeal and possible Article 78. Pending strategic considerations, these are 
important issues to litigate.   
 
In addition, pending strategic considerations and the procedural posture of the client’s matter, the 
Board’s failure to disclose portions of the parole file could be challenged immediately and 
directly via an Article 78.  For example, if the Board withholds portions of the parole file in the 
context of an administrative appeal, a challenge could be brought immediately via an Article 78 
as to that issue only, contending that the “body or officer failed to perform a duty enjoined upon 
it by law.”  See CPLR Art 7803(1).  And, filing the petition via an order to show cause, see 
CPLR §403(d), may shorten the Board’s time to answer and result in a more rapid decision.  
 
B. Portions of the Parole File the Board Routinely Withholds 
 
The Board routinely provides certain documents, such as portions of the Parole Board Report, 
prior denials and interview transcripts, COMPAS and case plans.  But, the Board routinely 
redacts portions of the COMPAS and Parole Board Report, and does not provide medical and 
mental health assessments, letters from the prosecuting district attorney, letters from the 
sentencing court, victim impact statements, and redacts the names and addresses from documents 
deemed “community opposition,” which ranges from petitions and letters opposing release.  The 
June, 2019 Directive should reduce some of these improper withholdings, but we anticipate it 
will take advocacy to assure that DOCCS follows the directive.  
 





(a) access shall not be granted to those portions of the case record to the extent that they 
contain: 
(1) diagnostic opinions which, if known to the inmate/releasee, could lead to a serious 
disruption of his institutional program or supervision; 
(2) materials which would reveal sources of information obtained upon a promise of 
confidentiality; 
(3) any information which if disclosed might result in harm, physical or otherwise, to 
any person25; 
(b) access by the Division of Parole shall not be granted to reports, documents and materials 
of other agencies, including but not limited to probation reports, drug abuse and 
alcoholism rehabilitation records, and the DCJS report. 9 NYCRR 8000.5(c)(2)(a). 
  
The Board’s routine withholding may derive from DOCCS’ entrenched practice of treating 
applicants’ requests for their parole files as FOIL requests, which is governed by 9 NYCRR 
8008.5 (not to be confused with 8000.5).26   
 
FOIL governs public access to records, not parole applicants’ access to their own files. Access to 
records pursuant to FOIL is subject to many exceptions which do not apply to requests made by 
parole applicants pursuant to section 8000.5. For example, a parole applicant’s medical and 
mental health evaluations which are part of parole files should be categorically withheld under 
FOIL as an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” N.Y. Pub. Off. Law, Art. 6, § 87(2)(b).  
Such reports might also be appropriately withheld under the applicable regulation, 
§8000.5(c)(2)(a), if they contain “diagnostic opinions which, if known to the inmate/release, 
could lead to a serious disruption of his institutional program or supervision.” But such 
assessment should take place on a case by case basis, not categorically as is the Board’s present 
practice. See e.g. Justice v. Comm'r of New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 130 
A.D.3d 1342, 1343 (3d Dep’t 2015) (“We find no basis to disturb Supreme Court's denial of 
petitioner's request for discovery of the confidential material relied on by DOCCS. The Board of 
Parole is authorized to treat records as confidential if their release “could endanger the life or 
safety of any person” (Public Officers Law § 87[2][a], [f]; see Executive Law § 259–k[2]; 9 
NYCRR 8000.5[c] [2][i][a][3]). Given petitioner's violent crimes, ongoing mental health issues 
and previous threats to staff at his prior residence while he was on parole, we find no abuse of 
discretion in Supreme Court's denial of petitioner's request for access to the confidential 
documents.” 
 
An unpublished Article 78 decision by J. Schlesinger, Andrews v. NYS DOCCS (Sup Ct., 2015), 
discusses these issues.  
 
 
25 John D. Justice v. DOCCCS, 130 A.D.3d 1342 (3d Dep’t 2015) (finding disclosure to petitioner of rejection 
records from potential post-release residences “could endanger the life or safety of any person” in light of 
petitioner's violent crimes, ongoing mental health issues and previous threats to staff at his prior residence while he 
was on parole). 
26 The Board appears to now understand that FOIL is not applicable in connection with applicants’ requests for their 
parole file, but confusion as to the controlling law persists and disclosure of parole files varies from facility to 
facility.  Should you run into a problem, contact the authors of this report and we will direct you to our contacts in 




C. DA and Sentencing Court Letters 
 
Pursuant to Exec. Law 259-i, the Board is required to consider the recommendations of defense 
counsel, the District Attorney and sentencing court.  Until recently, the Board refused to disclose 
such “official letters,” but the recent DOCCS directive finally recognizes that this material must 
be provided to the parole applicant. See June 3, 2019 Directive #2014.    
 
D. Victim Statements 
 
The Board is required to consider current and prior victim statements or statements by “the 
victim’s representative, where the crime victim is deceased or is mentally or physically 
incapacitated.” Exec. Law 259-i (2)(c). The Board will not provide victim statements to the 
applicant or counsel unless under court order.  The Board sometimes, but not always, submits the 
“confidential” portion of the parole file to the Article 78 judge in camera.  Consider moving the 
Article 78 court for access to this so-called “confidential material.”   
 
Counsel have had some limited success obtaining such material, which each time revealed that 
the Board had considered inappropriate information. At the very least, consider pressing the 
Article 78 court to review “confidential information” in camera to determine whether it was 
appropriately included in the parole file. Also note that if the Board relies on confidential 
information in denying parole, it should be stated in the parole decision.   
 
E. Opposition Material 
 
A category of the parole file commonly referred to as “community opposition” by the Board 
does not constitute victim statements and therefore should be provided to the parole applicant 
and counsel. Clark v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531 (2d Dept 2018).  Per 
Directive #14 the Board is beginning to disclose release “opposition” material.  The Board, 
however, routinely redacts the name and address of the writer.  Counsel may want to object to 
such redactions pending the particulars of the client’s case.  For example, since the Board is 
required to consider whether release would be incompatible with the welfare of society, there is a 
question whether opposition originating from out of state should be relevant.   
 
F. Pre-Sentencing Investigation Reports (PSIs Or PSRs) 
 
The Board heavily relies on the Pre-Sentencing Investigation Report, but will not provide it to 
the parole applicant. Sentencing in felony cases is preceded by an investigation by the county 
Department of Probation called a Pre-Sentence Investigation. During the “investigation,” the 
Department of Probation writes a report called the Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) or sometimes 
called the Pre-Sentence Investigation (PSI). The report is required in all felony cases per 
Criminal Procedure Law 390.20(1).   
 
The PSR details the defendant’s criminal history, level of involvement in the crime, remorse, 
information from the victim, and also mitigating factors and information about the defendant’s 




§390.50(2). If your client did not obtain the report at the time of sentence, which was rarely done 
in decades past, then a “written request” must be made to the sentencing court per the CPL.  
Some counties require an application by motion, in others a letter will suffice. Call the relevant 
Supreme Court county clerk and inquire as to the method employed in that county.  The 
indictment number of the case in which the sentence was imposed is necessary.  Incarcerated 
persons and attorneys have experienced heavy logistical and bureaucratic barriers to obtaining 
the PSR, despite the statute’s requirement that: “The court shall respond to the defendant’s 
written request within twenty days from receipt of the defendant’s written request.”  
 
Prison staff are also technically required to assist applicants in obtaining their PSR, although this 
is rarely done. Speak with your client about contacting their Offender Rehabilitation Coordinator 
(ORC) regarding the PSR. Also review DOCCS Directive #8370 
(http://www.doccs.ny.gov/Directives/8370.pdf). 
 
Attorneys may have success obtaining the PSR from appellate or even trial-level counsel.  
 
G. Prior Parole Interview Transcripts 
  
Parole files will often, but not always contain prior interview transcripts, but it is important to 
obtain these for the purpose of appeal.  Prior transcripts, when compared with the current 
transcript at issue may reveal appealable issues.  For example, irrationality might be documented 
if the Board did not deny based on public safety two years ago, but cites that basis in the current 
denial (assuming no intervening events).  
  
Prior transcripts can be obtained through a formal FOIL request directed to: 
  
NYS Dept. of Corrections & Community Supervision 
Attn. FOIL Unit, Room 316 
1220 Washington Avenue, Bldg. 2 
Albany, NY  12226-2050 
 
Clients may have more success requesting the transcripts themselves. Some transcripts requested 
through the FOIL process are redacted.  
  
H. Records Held by DOCCS Outside the Parole File 
 
Separate from the documents contained in the parole file, it is good practice to obtain a release 
from your client and request your client’s medical and mental health records (if relevant), 
disciplinary history and programming records. The client may already have these, so verify 
before submitting any requests.  
 
These documents can be obtained through an informal request (via letter, phone or sometimes 
even email) with an accompanying release sent to the client’s Offender Rehabilitation 
Coordinator or staff in “Inmate Records.” Call the prison to identify from whom to request these 






If an informal request is unsuccessful, then a formal FOIL request with an accompanying release 
will ensure you receive the records. See attached for a sample request and release. 
 
Mental and physical health records require special releases and procedures for obtaining them:  
 
Mental Health Records: The Office of Mental Health (OMH) is the NYS agency that provides 
mental health treatment within prisons. Your client must sign an OMH release authorization for 
you to obtain records on her/his/their mental health treatment, which is included in XVII below 
(HIPPA will not suffice).  To obtain the records, call New York Central Psychiatric Center (315-
765-3600) and explain that you are looking to obtain mental health records for someone in 
prison. The Center will let you know whether the applicant has had in-patient or out-patient 
treatment, which will dictate where (and to whom) to send the request(s). Typically, in-patient 
requests are addressed to the prison’s Mental Health Unit, and out-patient requests are addressed 
to the New York Central Psychiatric Center.  
 
Physical Health Records: Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HIPAA) is the 
federal law that establishes strict requirements for maintaining the privacy of medical and health-
related information. A HIPAA release form is required to get any documents on your applicant’s 
physical health.  To obtain these records, call the "Medical Records Unit" at the prison where the 
person is incarcerated. 
 
I. Other Resources 
 
Fordham University School of Law is currently compiling a searchable database of unpublished 
judicial decisions, sample administrative appeals and Article 78s, COMPAS reports, and other 
relevant documents. Notice will be sent when the database becomes available to the public.  
 
There is also a statewide listserv where attorneys working on parole litigation pose questions and 




















        
Appeals Unit 
New York State Board of Parole Harriman State Campus 
Building #2 
1220 Washington Avenue 
Albany, NY 12226 
 
Re: [Client] [DIN #]  
[Facility where incarcerated] 
[Date of interview and date of decision] 
[Where the interview occurred] 
 
Notice of Appearance of Counsel  
Request for Parole Interview Transcript 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
[Client] was denied parole on [date].  S/He filed a notice of administrative appeal in a timely 
manner.   
 
[Attorney/Firm] represents [Client] in connection with the administrative appeal of the [date] 
denial of parole and this letter serves as a notice of appearance. Therefore, please direct all 
correspondence in this matter to [attorney], at [address]. 
 
In addition, please provide a transcript of the [date] parole interview.  
 
Finally, please confirm receipt of this letter and indicate the deadline by which the appeal must 
be perfected. 
 









Sample Pre-Sentence Report Request 
Applicant’s Name 
DIN XX-X-XXXX 




[County and Clerk Where Sentencing Took Place] 
Example:  
Queens County Clerk 
Queens Supreme Court Building 
88-11 Sutphin Boulevard 
Queens, NY 11435 
 
[Same County as Above, Probation Dept.] 
Example:  
Queens County Department of Probation 
125-01 Queens Boulevard 
Queens, NY 11415 
 
To Whom it May Concern, 
 
My name is [NAME] (DIN XX-X-XXXX; NYSID XXXXXXX). I am writing to request a copy 
of my pre-sentencing report (“PSR”) that was issued in connection with case number XXXX-
XX, for which I was sentenced on [DATE] in Queens County.  
 
I am scheduled to appear before the Board of Parole for consideration for release on [DATE] or 
earlier. As such, I am entitled to a copy of my PSR under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 
390.50(2), which makes specific reference to individuals in my situation (in relevant part): 
 
Upon written request, the court shall make a copy of the presentence report, other than a part 
or parts of the report redacted by the court pursuant to this paragraph, available to the 
defendant for use before the parole board for release consideration or an appeal of a parole 
board determination. In his or her written request to the court the defendant shall affirm that he 
or she anticipates an appearance before the parole board or intends to file an administrative 
appeal of a parole board determination. The court shall respond to the defendant’s written 
request within twenty days from receipt of the defendant’s written request. 
 
I am copying the Queens County Department of Probation on this letter in hopes that it may 
expedite the process of retrieving my PSR and ensure that a copy is promptly sent to me. Thank 
you for your attention in this matter.  
 
Respectfully, 





FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) REQUEST 
[Date] 
To: [Name of Contact], Inmate Records 
 [Name of Correctional Facility]  
 [Address of Correctional Facility] 
  
RE: FOIL Request for Documents of [Full Name of Applicant], [DIN] 
 
Dear [Name of Contact],   
This letter is a formal FOIL request for the following documents of [Full Name of Applicant], 
[DIN]. I/we are representing [Full Name of Applicant] in an appeal of their most recent parole 
denial. Enclosed with this letter please find a release signed by [Full Name of Applicant] 
requesting and consenting to the disclosure of the following documents: 
 
1. Entire record of program participation, including any and all programs, classes, or 
activities, included but not limited to therapy or counseling, vocational training, 
education, and transitional services; 
2. All certificates of completion from any program, class, or activity. 
3. All evaluations from any program, class, or activity, and any and all progress notes, 
report cards, reviews, and evaluations; 
4. All quarterly inmate progress reports, both general and final evaluations, all inmate 
progress reports related to wages or pay, and all other progress reports in the central file;  
5. All Case Plans; 
6. All COMPAS Re-Entry assessments and related records; 
7. All disciplinary records, including misbehavior reports, disciplinary sheets, records of 
any investigations, records of any preliminary and final dispositions or adjudications, 
hearing records including transcripts or minutes of all proceedings, records related to any 
appeal of a disciplinary action, and records related to the discretionary review of any 
disciplinary actions; 
8. All previous Parole Board Reports, Inmate Status Reports, Commissioner Worksheets 
and any other materials generated for or by the Board of Parole in preparation for or after 
the completion of the applicant’s parole interview.   
9. All previous materials submitted to the Board of Parole including the parole packet, 
letters of support or opposition, pictures, certificates, GED scores, and other paperwork.  
 
We request all documents in electronic format pursuant to Public Officers Law § 89(3)(a). To the 
extent that the requested materials are not available in electronic format, we request an estimate 
of any and all fees, including the charges for reproducing records, before the documents are 
processed, copied or sent. We are willing to pay any reasonable fees for this request upon an 
advance estimate. Please direct all future written responses to our attention at the address below.   
 
Sincerely, 
[Your Full Name] 
[Affiliation] 
[Your Phone number] 




REQUEST FOR PAROLE FILE PURSUANT TO 9 NYCRR § 8000.5 
[Date] 
To: Senior Offender Rehabilitation Counselor [NAME] 
 [Name of Correctional Facility]  
 [Address of Correctional Facility] 
  
RE: Request for Documents of [Full Name of Applicant], [DIN] Pursuant to 9 NYCRR § 8000.5 
 
Dear SORC [Last Name], 
I am representing [Full Name of Applicant] in the appeal of their most recent parole denial. 
Pursuant to 9 NYCRR § 8000.5, I am requesting the documents listed below. Enclosed with this 
letter please find a release signed by [Full Name of Client] requesting and consenting to the 
disclosure of the following documents. Please note that this request is made pursuant to 9 
NYCRR § 8000.5(c)(3) and is NOT a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request.  
 
1. All prior Parole Board Reports and Inmate Status Reports; 
2. All prior transcripts of Parole Board interviews; 
3. All written decisions from the Parole Board; 
4. All Commissioner’s worksheets; 
5. All submissions made by [Full Name of Applicant], informally known as the “parole 
packet”; 
6. All prior COMPAS Re-Entry assessments; 
7. All letters from defense counsel; 
8. All letters from the district attorney; 
9. All letters from the sentencing court/judge; 
10. All letters and statements from the victims and/or their families and/or representatives  
11. All letters of support or opposition to the applicant’s release 
12. All letters labeled “community opposition” 
13. Past administrative parole appeal decisions  
 
We request all documents in electronic format. To the extent that the requested materials are not 
available in electronic format, we request an estimate of any and all fees, including the charges 
for reproducing records, before the documents are processed, copied or sent. We are willing to 
pay any reasonable fees for this request upon an advance estimate. Please direct all future written 
responses to our attention at the address below.   
 
Sincerely, 
[Your Full Name] 
[Affiliation] 
[Your Phone number] 





RELEASE OF PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
AUTHORIZATION FORM 
 
To: Senior Offender Rehabilitation Counselor/Inmate Records  
 [Name of Correctional Facility]  
 [Address of Correctional Facility] 
  
RE: Release of Documents of [Full Name of Applicant], [DIN]  
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
I, [First and Last Name of Applicant], the undersigned, hereby authorize the New York State 
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter, “DOCCS”) to release and to 
give to [Your First and Last Name or Names], any and all information and records pertaining to 
me, from any period of incarceration in a New York State Prison or Correctional Facility, or any 
institution under the authority of DOCCS, including the Board of Parole under the DIN number 
[DIN]. 
 
I hereby waive any privileges that I may have concerning this information, including any right of 
privacy created by statute or common law.  This release is effective until you are notified by me 












Sworn before me this       
______ day of ____________ 2019 
_______________________________       
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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